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Unreliable access to electricity is the norm rather than the exception in many 
developing countries. This dissertation analyzes the causes and consequences of outages 
and evaluates the economic benefits of addressing them. The first chapter investigates how 
the demand for electricity reliability can be estimated in the absence of markets for it. 
Employing two complementary pieces of information from a nationally representative 
sample of grid-connected consumers in Nepal - coping behavior and stated willingness to 
pay (WTP) - demand electricity reliability is estimated. The results indicate substantial 
heterogeneity in ex-ante demand for reliability and ex-post increase in electricity 
consumption levels, even within the same tariff categories. For policy-making purposes, 
the findings highlight the importance of conducting a detailed analysis of information on 
households’ preferences and firms’ opportunity costs when evaluating the benefits from 
reliability investments. 
Chapter two focuses on evaluating the economic benefits of mitigating the risk of 
unplanned outages in overloaded electric networks. Although electric utilities meter the 
amount of electricity consumed by individual customers, the physical structure of 
electricity distribution networks creates a shared level of reliability. The question that arises 
here is whether the shared nature of electric networks makes them susceptible to the 
common-pool resource (CPR) problem. Using firm- and substation-level data from a 
nationally representative sample of Nepalese firms, the findings indicate that the CPR 
problem would be largely solved if private firms were allowed to own and operate 
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substations. The cost-benefit analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that the annual 
gain from eliminating this restriction would be on the order of 0.32 USD million. 
The third chapter estimates the extent to which electricity consumers of different 
income levels would increase their use of high-load appliances in response to 
improvements in grid reliability. The results indicate that although grid-connected 
households are counted in the electrification statistics, unreliable electricity service 
significantly constrains their electric appliance ownership and, consequently, electricity 
consumption. Putting this paper’s findings into Sustainable Development Goal 7’s 
perspective, a connection to the grid by itself does not necessarily translate to realized 
benefits from electricity consumption. The availability and reliability of the service play a 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF UNSUPPLIED ELECTRICITY: EVIDENCE 
FROM NEPAL 
1.1 Introduction 
During the past decade, extending access to electricity has been a priority for many 
governments and international development organizations. As of 2018, significant progress 
has been made in this regard: the world’s population living without electricity has 
decreased from 1.2 billion in 2010 to 789 million people in 2018 (World Bank, 2020). 
However, these electrification rates do not adequately capture the degree of usability of 
available electricity for “electrified” consumers. There are many instances in which 
households and business enterprises receive electricity with frequent and long 
interruptions. Unreliable electricity service adds coping expenditures to electricity utility 
bills and reduces electricity consumption levels, leading to an overall reduction in the 
potential benefits of having uninterrupted access to electricity (Bhatia and Angelou, 2015)1.  
On the supply side, upgrading the generation capacity and maintaining the electricity 
supply infrastructure can improve reliability, but it requires capital investments. The costs 
of such investments are expected to be covered, at least partly, by revenues for the electric 
utility to remain financially sustainable. Thus, understanding consumers’ willingness to 
pay for improved reliability provides critical information to utility managers, 
policymakers, and investors when assessing investments’ costs-recovery potential. On the 
                                                          
1 In this paper, reliability refers to the ability of the power system to maintain the delivery of 
uninterrupted electric service to customers in the face of uncertainty in operating conditions.  
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demand side, the first step is to clarify why some consumers value electricity reliability 
more than others. In energy-poor contexts, a concrete step towards understanding drivers 
of the demand for electricity reliability and uptake of off-grid backup sources is an analysis 
of associations between household- and firm-level characteristics and electricity 
consumption. 
Due to the lack of market mechanisms to allocate electricity reliability in many 
developing countries, the economic value of electricity reliability cannot be directly 
observed. Previous studies have used two approaches to measure the demand for reliability: 
the stated preference approach and the revealed preference approach (Carlsson and 
Martinsson 2008; Reichl et al., 2013; Ozbafli and Jenkins, 2015; Ozbafli and Jenkins, 2016; 
Oseni, 2017; Morrissey et al., 2018; Carlsson et al., 2020; Niroomand and Jenkins 2020a; 
Niroomand and Jenkins 2020b)2. Depending on data availability and the plausibility of a 
model’s assumptions in a given setting, revealed or stated preference approaches had been 
used interchangeably (Klytchnikova and Lokshin, 2009). Given that each of these 
approaches provides a different subset of insights about how different categories of 
consumers value electricity reliability and what characteristics explain different valuations 
for reliability, it would be informative to analyze the results generated by the two 
approaches simultaneously. However, there is no such empirical evidence in the existing 
literature of electricity reliability. 
                                                          
2 The stated preference approach elicits willingness to pay for improvements directly through a 
contingent valuation or a choice experiment survey, while the revealed preference approach uses 
data derived from the actual choices consumers make to cope with unreliable service and the real 
expenditures associated with these choices. 
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This paper fills this gap by investigating two distinct demand-related variables, 
revealed coping behavior and stated WTP, using a rich nationally-representative sample of 
1,800 residential and 590 non-residential electricity customers in Nepal3. In principle, 
coping behavior to deal with power outages and stated WTP for reliability improvements 
related manifestation of the same underlying preferences for electricity reliability. 
Nonetheless, there are essential differences between the two: coping expenditures represent 
the economic value of non-incremental benefits from direct resource cost-saving, i.e., a 
lower bound for WTP for a well-functioning grid (Devicienti et al., 2004). Stated WTP 
values, on the other hand, reflect the economic value of incremental benefits (i.e., 
additional consumption) in terms of additional induced demand due to supply availability. 
The findings indicate that although those in higher quartiles of residential electricity 
bills invest substantially more in coping equipment than those in lower quartiles, the stated 
WTP for reliability improvements diminishes as one moves from lower quartiles to higher 
quartiles. The coping behavior of non-residential consumers shows a similar pattern to 
residential ones, but their stated WTP values do not: industrial consumers state WTP values 
for improvements two and four times of WTP stated by domestic and commercial 
consumers, respectively. A closer look at the adoption pattern of coping equipment reveals 
that these differences can be explained by the substitutability of electricity service provided 
by the coping equipment. 
                                                          
3 The survey used in this study is conducted by the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 




Moreover, the obtained ex-ante WTP values indicate that consumers under the 
industrial electricity tariff category have the highest demand for electricity reliability, 
followed by those under commercial and domestic tariff categories. Nepal has managed to 
eliminate seasonal shortages in its hydropower generation since 2017 by increasing its 
electricity imports from India. This change is used to compare the ex-ante predictions to 
the ex-post electricity consumption levels. As predicted by ex-ante WTP estimates, 
industrial consumers show the highest increase in electricity consumption after 
improvements. 
This study contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, it uses a 
nationally representative sample of electricity customers compromising of both residential 
and business customers. Earlier studies on the microeconomics of electricity reliability in 
developing countries have focused only on either residential or business customers, and 
they have been limited to small samples of customers with the number of observations 
limited to a few hundred4. The only exception at the time of this study is Deutschmann et 
al. (2019) that evaluates the willingness to pay for reliable electricity for a nationally-
representative sample of Senegalese households and firms. Consistent with Deutschmann 
et al. (2019), this paper’s findings highlight that the costs of unsupplied electricity and 
consumers’ behavioral changes after reliability improvements are widely different across 
and within various consumers’ categories. 
                                                          
4 For instance, Ghosh et al. (2017) uses a sample of 260 small-scale firms in Hyderabad, India. 




Second, previous studies have only analyzed the ex-ante predicted demand for 
electricity reliability, and there is no empirical evidence on how consumers actually 
respond to reliability improvements ex-post. This paper provides the first empirical 
evidence on how responses vary across and within different categories of consumers. 
Understanding which category of consumers is most likely to benefit from reliability 
improvements can help policymakers to better target reliability investments and allocate 
resources where they are needed the most.  
Third, given the chronic nature of electricity reliability in low-income countries, this 
study’s findings would be relevant to policymakers in these countries. Without 
understanding the current and future demand for electricity, making socially optimal 
investment decisions and effective planning for sustained supply of electricity is impossible 
(De Nooij et al., 2007). While some consumers have high latent demand for fully reliable 
electricity service (such as industrial consumers with heavy equipment), others have lower 
demand levels (e.g., low-income households with demand only for lighting purposes). In 
the absence of markets for electricity reliability, the value of unsupplied electricity should 
be assessed carefully depending on the consumer mix in a given region to avoid under- or 
over-estimating WTP values (Sullivan et al., 2010). Otherwise, the outcome will be 
increasing electricity provision to those who do not seek it, leading to a less efficient 
allocation of electricity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the previous 
literature on the unreliability of electricity supply. Section 1.3 describes the data and 
methodology, followed by the theoretical model’s description in Section 1.4. The empirical 
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results are then discussed in Section 1.5. The robustness of estimated WTPs is tested in 
Section 1.6. Section 1.7 lists the conclusions of the paper. 
1.2 Related literature on unreliable electricity supply 
For many countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, an unreliable electricity 
supply is a norm rather than the exception. Public electric utilities in these countries are 
severely capital-rationed, and electricity rates are heavily regulated. Electricity rates are 
not only maintained below the long-run cost of generation plus transmission and 
distribution, but they also cannot be adjusted when seasonal shortages exist. The 
consequence of this practice is a deterioration of the electricity reliability that imposes costs 
and inconvenience on electricity consumers. Previous literature documents that 
intermittent electricity service results in revenue losses for firms due to under-utilization 
of production capacity and inconvenience for households due to inability to utilize their 
desired energy services (Steinbuks and Foster 2010; Alby et al., 2012; Chakravorty et al., 
2014; Fisher-Vanden et al., 2015; Allcott et al., 2016; Samad and Zhang, 2016; Falentina 
and Resosudarmo, 2019; Bajo-Buenestado, 2020).  
When electricity is an essential input for a firm’s operation, empirical evidence 
suggests that an unreliable supply can adversely affect its productivity. Allcott et al. (2016) 
analyze the impact of electricity shortages caused by the seasonality of hydropower 
availability on large manufacturing firms in India. Their findings reveal that India’s 
electricity shortages have reduced the average firm’s revenues by 5 to 10 percent. 
Similarly, Grainger and Zhang (2019) evaluate the cost of electricity shortages for 
manufacturing firms in Pakistan. They estimate that an additional average daily hour of 
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unexpected power outages decreases a firm’s annual revenues by 10 percent, decreases 
annual value-added at the firm level by 20 percent, and increases the labor share of output. 
These impacts highlight the significant role of having access to reliable power 
infrastructure on economic growth (Andersen and Dalgaard, 2013).  
The opportunity cost of unsupplied electricity for firms can be measured by the value 
of forgone production per kWh of unsupplied electricity. An accurate estimation of 
opportunity cost requires access to detailed operating accounts of business enterprises 
(Hashemi et al., 2018). In the absence of such data, the stated WTP values can approximate 
a firm’s actual WTP value for a reliable electricity supply. By analyzing the relationship 
between the estimated WTP and observable characteristics of firms, we can better 
understand firms’ decision-making when it comes to coping with the unreliable supply of 
electricity.  
The welfare impacts of intermittent electricity supply are not limited only to non-
residential consumers. Ozbafli and Jenkins (2016) use the choice experiment method to 
evaluate households’ WTP for improved electricity service in North Cyprus. Their findings 
show that households are willing to pay premia of 3.6 percent and 13.9 percent of their 
current electricity bills for summer and winter, respectively, to get uninterrupted service. 
Similarly, Oseni (2017) estimates the WTP of a sample of Nigerian households for 
improved reliability of grid-supplied electricity. The findings indicate that households are 
willing to pay more on top of their monthly bills for reliable service, and WTP is 




After identifying the causes and impacts of unreliability, the next challenge is to 
evaluate potential solutions. Various responses are available to electric utility companies 
and policymakers (Gertler et al., 2017). In the long run, investments in generation, 
transmission, and distribution capacities, as well as institutional reforms, can ensure that 
the electric grid satisfies the increasing demand for reliable electricity. In the short run, 
pricing mechanisms can help manage demand by adjusting electricity prices when load 
curtailment is required. Time-of-day tariffs (also known as peak-load pricing) can shift 
consumption during peak times toward users with the highest marginal benefits. 
Interruptible electricity contracts provide rebates to users that choose to accept outages 
during periods of peak demand. Finally, quantity rationing can be employed through load 
shedding programs, a system in which the power supply is interrupted to different areas for 
non-overlapping periods. 
In Nepal, the electricity utility company is a state-owned vertically-integrated 
monopoly with regulated electricity tariffs. Quantity rationing (also known as load 
shedding) has been the method of dealing with seasonal electricity shortages. The efficient 
energy allocation to ration this excess demand is to provide the available energy to those 
valuing it the most, those with the highest opportunity cost of unsupplied power. With no 
system for identifying the value placed by individual customers on each unit of energy 
received, however, the utility company curtails power arbitrarily to different groups of 
consumers or makes a judgment by its own priority system of where the energy is least 
valued. Timilsina et al. (2018) estimate the economy-wide costs of load shedding Nepal 
faced using a computable general equilibrium model. Their findings indicate that annual 
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gross domestic product would have been 7 percent higher than it was during 2008–16 if 
there had been no load shedding. 
1.3 Data and methodology 
1.3.1 Electricity Supply in Nepal 
Hydropower represents 90 percent of the total installed generation capacity in Nepal, 
mostly run-of-the-river type. With river flow being governed by the monsoon and dry 
seasons, Nepal experiences significant generation declines during the dry season5. Figure 
1.1 depicts the variation in total hydroelectricity generation during 2016, the year in which 
the survey data used in this paper were collected. The average monthly rainfall drops 
significantly between the two seasons (Panel A), leading to a sharp drop in hydropower 
generation (Panel B). The installed capacity in 2016 was 856 MW, whereas peak demand 
amounted to 1,385 MW. This resulted in a 534 MW of power deficit with daily outages of 
up to 11 hours during the dry season. Figure 1.2 shows the hydroelectricity generation 
pattern during the five years before 2016, confirming that this pattern is not unique to 2016. 
In response to low hydropower generation levels during the dry season, Nepal 
Electricity Authority (NEA), the central government-owned generator, grid operator, and 
distributor, curtails power supply to all customers through a rationing program known as 
                                                          
5 Only 14% of the total installed capacity is in the form of dam storage-type hydropower 
installations. These dams can store water for long periods and use it to continue full generation 
during the dry season when run-of-river types reduce output due to lower river flows. However, 
most of the hydropower projects in Nepal as of the time of this study are run-of-river types because 
storage-type dams are significantly costlier at least for two reasons: (a) storage-type dams require 
substantial submergence of forest and agricultural land; and, (b) Himalayan rivers in Nepal contain 
large quantities of sediment with hard abrasive particles that reduce the lifespan of reservoirs by 
decreasing storage capacity (Thapa et al., 2005). 
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load shedding. This program assigns all grid-connected consumers to different groups and 
cuts their electricity during specific hours of the day that are announced ahead of time. To 
reduce the extent of the load shedding, Nepal has relied on electricity imports from India6. 
Electricity imports have increased threefold since 2010, from 638 GWh in 2010 to 1,777 
GWh in 2016 (NEA, 2017). Due to insufficient cross-border transmission capacity, Nepal 
has not fully benefited from India’s electricity trade to eliminate its domestic power 
deficits7. 
1.3.2 Household data 
The household sample used in this study contains 1,800 grid-connected households 
across Nepal. The survey design team took various measures to ensure that households’ 
data were selected randomly and nationally representative (see Appendix A for more detail 
about national-representativeness). First, to avoid selection bias against the most remote 
rural areas, a GIS-based household selection was followed in rural areas. Similarly, a GIS-
                                                          
6 An alternative for imports would be developing domestic storage-type hydropower projects. The 
cost of electricity imports from India is projected to range from NPR 5 to 9 per kWh, but the 
projected cost of electricity generated by domestic storage projects is more than NPR 10 per kWh 
from (World Bank, 2019a). This is why developing domestic storage projects are not economically 
feasible at the current level of demand in Nepal despite the high potential of hydropower capacity. 
Moreover, another advantage of power trades with India is that Nepal will be able to export its 
surplus capacity to India during the rainy season. 
 
7 In 2011, the construction of Nepal-India Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (NIETTP) 
started with financing from the World Bank and a group of international development 
organizations. The main aim of this project was to increase the cross-border transmission capacity 
between India and Nepal to facilitate electricity trade between the two countries. Nepal will be able 
to export its surplus power to India during the monsoon season and to import from India during the 
dry season in order to eliminate load shedding. In the results section, this project is used to 
investigate whether the estimated WTP values among electricity consumers for reliability 
improvements would map into changes in electricity consumption after improvements by NIETTP. 
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based Random Start or Fanning method was used in the urban areas, based on a sample 
frame obtained from the NEA.  
Also, to ensure that the sample is nationally representative, the same sampling strategy 
used by Nepal’s bureau of statistics and the World Bank is employed. Geographically, 
Nepal is divided into three ecological regions: Mountain, Hill, and southern flat land called 
Terai (see Figure 1.3). The Mountain region accounts for 35 percent of the country’s total 
land area, while Hills and Terai accounting for 42 percent and 23 percent, respectively. The 
Terai zone contains 50 percent of the total population, while Hill and Mountain have 43 
percent and 7 percent, respectively.  
Any ward belonging to a Village Development Committee (VDC) as per the 2011 
census (the latest available at the time of the survey) was treated as a rural location, and 
any ward belonging to a Municipality/Sub-metropolitan/Metropolitan city as an urban 
ward. The final sample is achieved by splitting the country into four strata: Rural Hills, 
Rural Terai, Urban wards outside Kathmandu Valley, and Urban Kathmandu Valley8. A 
sample of 400 households is allocated for each stratum except for the urban locations 
outside Kathmandu Valley, where a sample of 600 households is allocated (i.e., a total of 
1,800 interviews)9.  
                                                          
8 Kathmandu Valley comprises urban areas in the districts of Kathmandu (the capital city), Lalitpur 
and Bhaktapur. Outside Kathmandu comprises all other urban areas – municipalities (cities and 
towns) – located outside of the Kathmandu Valley. 
 
9 Outside-Kathmandu Valley stratum had been oversampled to ensure a sufficient sample allowing 
for any differences in electricity consumption within the urban locations across Nepal other than 




Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the households’ sample10. All of the 
surveyed households were connected to the national electricity grid at the time of the 
survey11. Urban households constitute 56 percent of the sample, with 22 percent residing 
within the Kathmandu Valley. Of the 44 percent of the rural population, exactly half reside 
in Terai, with the other half residing in mountainous regions. Survey enumerators collected 
information about the average monthly electricity bills of households by observing the 
electricity bills. The survey also collected information about possible demand-shifting 
sociodemographic characteristics of households such as income, education of the 
household head, number of household members, number of rooms in the house, number of 
children of school age (6-14 years old), and ownership of TVs, radios, and computers.   
Unscheduled interruptions in electric service and fluctuations in voltage constrain the 
use of high-voltage appliances (such as refrigerators, televisions, and computers) and result 
in a malfunction of appliances. The survey finds that households engage in various coping 
behaviors when electricity from the grid is not available or when there are fluctuations in 
the voltage of electricity drawn from the grid.  
                                                          
10 Tables 1.1 and 1.2 do not report the descriptive statistics of respondents’ stated WTP. Later in 
the paper, Tables 1.3 and 1.4 represent descriptive statistics of stated WTPs for the household 
sample and the firm sample, respectively. 
 
11 By 2016, 72% of Nepalese households were connected to the national grid, whereas 23% are 
connected to off-grid sources (such as solar), and 5% of the households have no access to electricity 




In addition to the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, Table 1.1 also reports the 
descriptive statistics by quartiles of the electricity bills12. Those data indicate that 
households are mostly rural in the lower quartiles while most households in the higher 
quartiles are urban. Also, income varies within all quartiles of electricity bills; energy-poor 
households are not necessarily income-poor.   
Another interesting pattern in Table 1.1 is the adoption of alternative power sources 
across quartiles of electricity bills. Solar panels, solar lanterns, torch lights, emergency 
lights, and candles show a similar uptake pattern across all electricity-bill quartiles. 
However, there is a distinct uptake pattern for inverters and kerosene: kerosene is mostly 
adopted by the first and second quartiles of electricity bills. In contrast, inverters are the 
preferred backup technology among consumers in the third and fourth quartiles.  
1.3.3 Firms data 
Similar measures were taken to ensure the quality of data collected from business 
enterprises. The sample frame for business enterprises is provided by Nepal’s Inland 
Revenue Department (IRD), segregated into service and manufacturing/industrial firms. 
The same definition of businesses used by the IRD is used: “small” businesses have an 
annual turnover (gross sales) of less than NPR 50 million (USD 0.47 million); and 
“medium” businesses have an annual turnover between NPR 50 million and NPR 400 
                                                          
12 Using the electricity tariffs published in 2016 annual report by NEA, the KWh of electricity 
consumed by each quartile of electricity bills can be approximated. The average monthly 
consumption is less than 30KWh, 31-150 KWh, 151-400 KWh, and more than 400 KWh for the 
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quartiles, respectively. 
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million (USD 0.47-3.8 million). Firms with an annual turnover greater than NPR 400 
million (USD 3.8 million) are categorized as “large.”  
The achieved sample size is 590 businesses: 340 industrial or manufacturing firms and 
250 service-oriented firms, with 46, 38, and 16 percent of firms being small, medium, and 
large, respectively (see Table 1.2). As in the household sample, the descriptive statistics 
for the firms’ sample are reported by their electricity consumption intensity. There are three 
main electricity tariff categories for business enterprises in the sample: domestic, 
commercial, and industrial. On average, the monthly electricity bills of industrial 
consumers are 24 times and 50 times more than the average monthly electricity bills of 
commercial and domestic subscribers, respectively. Firms in the domestic tariff category 
are mostly small and medium firms active in the service-oriented sectors.  
Adopting coping technology among firms is different from households due to their 
different demand for electricity. Firms often use electricity for purposes other than lighting, 
such as running different equipment types, which is why we observe a higher adoption rate 
of inverters and diesel generators among firms. The opportunity cost of unsupplied 
electricity to most firms is so high that they self-generate electricity when the grid is down, 
even though self-generated electricity is costlier and inferior to grid electricity in terms of 
load (Burgess et al. 2019)13. The adoption rate of diesel generators increases as we go from 
                                                          
13 Some firms (those which are not operating 24 hours) might have the option of making up some 
fraction of lost production time by working overtime and extra shifts (Wing and Rose, 2020). In 
most cases, however, it is unlikely that a profit-maximizing firm would have an economic incentive 
to engage in overtime production, unless the firm is constrained by contractual obligations 
(Munasinghe and Gellerson, 1979). Also, it might be argued that firms can plan ahead of time by 
keeping inventories during the dry season. Since the dry season lasts for a few months in Nepal, 
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the domestic tariff category toward the industrial tariff category. It is also observed that the 
adoption of voltage stabilizers is more prevalent among firms than households, most likely 
because firms have expensive equipment that is more sensitive to voltage fluctuations. 
Some firms also use solar panels to cope with the unreliable supply of grid electricity, but 
firms mostly use them in the domestic tariff category with low electricity demand. 
1.3.4 Contingent valuation survey design, limitations, and potential biases 
 In a contingent valuation framework, two electricity reliability improvement 
scenarios were proposed to the respondents. Respondents were asked to state how much 
they were willing to pay on top of their current electricity bills for (i) 50 percent reduction 
in the planned outages; (ii) 100 percent reduction in the planned outages14. The survey 
design provided a bidding process to elicit the respondents’ WTP for each proposed 
improvement in a double-bounded dichotomous choice format. Using the answers and bids, 
the mean WTP can be estimated by applying a double-bounded model (also known as 
interval data model). 
                                                          
most firms would not be able to make required investments in physical planning or operate 
profitably by keeping high stakes of inventories. 
 
14 Interruptions in electricity service are mainly categorized into planned and unplanned outages. 
Scheduled or planned outages occur due to lack of capacity in generation and/or transmission 
segments of electricity supply chain. Unplanned outages happen at the distribution level due to 
different factors such as overloaded transformers and non-technical losses (such as theft and illegal 
connections). While planned outages can be totally eliminated countrywide by upgrading the 
upstream (generation and transmission) capacities, unplanned outages often require local solutions. 
Identifying the type of outages without detailed data from the electric utility is an empirical 
challenge. In Nepal, however, all electricity consumers can clearly distinguish planned outages 




The initial bid offer was generated as a random amount in NPR from zero to a hundred 
percent of the respondent’s average monthly grid electricity bill. If the respondent agreed 
that they would pay this initial amount (a “yes” response), then they would be asked if they 
were willing to increase their payment in steps of 10 percent until the response was “no”. 
If the response to the initial random bid was a “no”, then this initial bid was decreased in 
steps of 10 percent of the respondent’s electricity bill until the respondent said “yes” to the 
proposed amount.  
Before starting the bidding process, a few quality measures are taken to reduce biases 
that can be potentially introduced during a contingent valuation survey. A cheap-talk script 
was read to the respondents about hypothetical bias, and respondents were asked to state 
their WTP for the proposed policies “as if” those proposals would be implemented (see 
Box B1 in Appendix B). Moreover, the script includes consequential features intended to 
convey to respondents that their responses were of consequence and could eventually result 
in real policy changes: ”…if you value electricity enough, the government may decide to 
invest more in electricity, and your tariff may have to increase to pay for the investment.”15  
Moreover, previous studies show that the payment vehicle — how respondents are 
asked to pay for the reliability improvements — is also an important design issue in 
contingent valuation surveys. If respondents do not believe the credibility of payment 
vehicle, their responses may be biased (Gunatilake et al., 2007; Whittington and Pagiola, 
                                                          
15 There is some evidence that cheap-talk and consequential scripts effectively reduce the 




2012). The valuation questions in this survey are designed to be asked from an ex-ante 
perspective in the form of increments to current electricity bills. The questions target the 
premium the respondent would be willing to pay in addition to current monthly bills to 
have an improved electricity service. Given that all the surveyed households and firms are 
already connected to the grid and are familiar with electricity bills as the payment vehicle, 
this should not be of great concern.  
Despite the application of contingent surveys in eliciting WTP values, the validity of 
estimates by this method has been subject to criticism. This study tests the validity of the 
results to the extent possible. For instance, one major concern with contingent valuation 
studies is that they measure ex-ante demands based on hypothetical proposed situations. 
Previous studies have pointed out that this hypothetical nature can lead to overestimating 
the real WTP (Blumenschein et al., 1998; Penn and Hu, 2018). Although the possibility of 
such bias cannot be ruled out in this analysis, it should not be of significant concern. 
Respondents in the sample not only have experienced load shedding schedules announcing 
planned outages for several years proceeding to the survey, but they also have a clear 
understanding of how improvements in the reliability of electricity service would be. The 
first proposed improvement is a 50 percent reduction in outages. This can be related to 
when the dry season is coming to an end, and the load shedding schedule starts to disappear. 
Similarly, the second proposed improvement is a total elimination of planned outages, 
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which is the electricity supply status during the wet season when there is no load 
shedding16.  
Another concern is how accurately contingent valuation surveys reveal respondents’ 
“true” preferences and costs. In this study, to encourage respondents to focus on the 
marginal benefits and costs, the survey questions were designed very carefully. The 
questions asked, “how much additional to the current bill” customers would be willing to 
pay instead of “how much of a tariff” they would be willing to pay for a reduction of 
planned outages. This difference provides a set of comparable relative costs and benefits 
and results in more reliable WTP estimates, expressing customers’ preferences and costs 
more accurately (Ghosh et al., 2017). 
The application of stated preference methods has also been associated with concerns 
about ordering effects (Bateman et al., 2004). Although the possibility of this bias cannot 
be completely ruled out in this analysis, the survey was designed and implemented in a 
way that mitigated ordering effects bias to some extent. The respondents were aware that 
a series of questions would be asked regarding their WTP. This process, known as 
advanced disclosure, is shown to be an effective design factor in mitigating ordering effects 
(Bateman et al., 2004; Aravena et al., 2012; Day et al., 2012). 
                                                          
16 The possibility of delivering the proposed project and familiarity of respondents with the 
proposed improvements do not necessarily translate into the elimination of hypothetical bias. The 
main idea here is to highlight that respondents are very well familiar with the nature of planned 
outages and can refer to their actual experiences when evaluating the proposed improvements. 
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Finally, construct validity can be used to evaluate the accuracy of WTP responses 
generated by the contingent valuation survey17. In this paper, a set of regressions is used to 
examine the relationship between a respondent’s WTP and the observable characteristics 
that are pointed out by economic theory as the plausible determinants of the WTP. 
1.3.5 Empirical strategy 
Given that respondents are presented with two bid levels, the second bid is contingent 
upon a response to an initial bid (𝐵𝑖). If the response to the initial bid is yes, the second bid 
is higher (𝐵𝐻); otherwise, it is lower (𝐵𝐿). Thus, there are four possible outcomes: yes-yes, 
no-no, yes-no, and no-yes. The likelihoods of these outcomes are denoted by 𝜋𝑦𝑦, 𝜋𝑛𝑛, 
𝜋𝑦𝑛, and 𝜋𝑛𝑦 , respectively, 
 
𝜋𝑦𝑦(𝐵𝑖, 𝐵𝐻) = Pr(𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝐻 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗) = Pr(𝐵𝐻 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗)
= 1 − 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗(𝐵𝐻; 𝜃) 
(1) 
 
𝜋𝑛𝑛(𝐵𝑖, 𝐵𝐿) = Pr(𝐵𝑖 ≥ 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝐿 ≥ 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗) = Pr(𝐵𝐿 ≥ 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗)
= 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗(𝐵𝐿; 𝜃) 
(2) 
 𝜋𝑦𝑛(𝐵𝑖, 𝐵𝐻) = Pr(𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗ ≤  𝐵𝐻) = 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗(𝐵𝐻; 𝜃) − 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗(𝐵𝑖; 𝜃) (3) 
 𝜋𝑛𝑦(𝐵𝑖, 𝐵𝐿) = Pr(𝐵𝑖 ≥ 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗ ≥  𝐵𝐿) = 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗(𝐵𝑖; 𝜃) − 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗(𝐵𝐿; 𝜃). (4) 
                                                          
17 Construct validity refers to how well the measurement is predicted by factors that one would 




𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗(. ) is the cumulative distribution function of the 𝑊𝑇𝑃
∗. Given a sample of n 
respondents and the bids 𝐵𝑖, 𝐵𝐿, and 𝐵𝐻, the log-likelihood function of the double-bounded 
model takes the following form, 
 





















 are binary variables and θ is a vector of parameters of interest. 
In the double-bounded model, the maximum likelihood estimation directly estimates the 
parameters of interest. Once the estimated parameters are obtained, we can estimate 
households’ WTP18. 
1.4 Theoretical model 
Suppose there are two types of electricity consumers, low demanders, and high 
demanders; and, two states of the world, dry season with a frequency of planned outages 
𝜑 and monsoon season without planned outages. High demanders are those consumers 
whose WTP for uninterrupted electricity service justifies investments in high-quality 
backup sources such as diesel generators and inverters. Low demanders are those 
consumers whose WTP only justifies adopting low-quality backup services such as 
kerosene and candles when the grid is down. 
                                                          
18 The doubleb Stata command developed by Lopez-Feldman (2012) is used for estimation.  
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The question is to what extent consumers are willing to pay for incremental electric 
system reliability improvements that eliminate seasonal outages. Panel A in Figure 1.4 
shows the situation for a high demander. When the supply is unconstrained (i.e., during 
monsoon season), sufficient generation capacity allows consumers to buy all their needed 
power from the electricity utility company (Qu) at the regulated electricity tariff (𝑃𝑅). When 
supply becomes constrained (i.e., during dry season), however, consumers can only buy 
electricity from the utility company during non-load-shedding hours (Q𝑐). Although high 
demanders supplement the grid-supplied electricity with backup generators, the cost of 
self-generation is greater than the utility company’s tariff. So, these consumers self-
generate only up to a point (Qc + self) that is less than what they would have purchased from 
the grid without any constraint (Qu). If the reliability were improved, high demanders 
would be willing to pay approximately the area (𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐸) multiplied by 𝜑. In other 
words, the WTP value will increase until a 100 percent reduction in outages is achieved.  
 For low demanders, depicted in Panel B of Figure 1.4, the situation is different. The 
marginal cost of self-generation is sufficiently high that this group cannot justify 
investments in generators. These consumers tend to use coping equipment other than 
generators. However, the question is how they would respond to improvements. Assuming 
that the initial frequency of planned outages is 𝜑0, a partial improvement in the availability 
of electricity service (−∆𝜑 < 𝜑0) is associated with a surplus gain of approximately 
(−∆𝜑) × (𝐴 + 𝐶). Total elimination of planned outages (−∆𝜑 = 𝜑0) will result in even a 
higher gain in consumer surplus because of the income effect from improved electricity 
service (demand curve rotates outward from 𝐷0 to 𝐷1). Practically, improved reliability 
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results in savings in the expected monetary costs of injuries by low-quality backup and 
reduced leisure. The gross WTP for total elimination can, therefore, be approximated by 
𝜑0 × (𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝐺 + 𝐻 + 𝐼). This implies that this type also puts a higher value on the 
quality of the additional improvement that eliminates the uncertainty associated with power 
outages. 
The theoretical model suggests that respondents are expected to state higher WTP for 
electricity reliability improvements until full reliability is achieved. This behavior is 
consistent with the real-world observation of consumers’ behavior when coping with 
unreliable public electricity provision. When the national grid is down, consumers lack 
equivalent perfect substitutes. Provision of electricity is different from other public 
domains such as water supply. Installing home water treatments when the water supply is 
unreliable may be sufficient to solve consumers’ water problems. In that case, the 
substantial sunk costs may alter the consumer’s behavior regarding the provision of an 
improved water supply. Therefore, the consumer may not be willing to pay for 
improvements (Devicienti et al., 2004).  
However, in the case of electricity supply, although consumers invest in alternative 
power sources, they do so to the equivalent of electricity autarky (off-grid alternative 
sources of power), with costs far more than grid electricity (due to scale economies in grid 
supply) and with power loads less than a well-functioning grid (Burgess et al., 2019). 
Therefore, those who invested in coping equipment may be willing to pay even more than 
those who have not. 
23 
 
1.5 Empirical results 
Table 1.3 reports the mean estimated WTP of households in the sample. The results 
show that households incur on average a premium almost as much as their average monthly 
grid-electricity bills (95 percent) in the form of coping expenditures. Looking at the 
estimated WTP values based on the quartiles of electricity bills, it is apparent that such 
expenditures are relatively higher for households with lower consumption levels: those in 
the first quartile incur coping expenditures 1.6 times more than their electricity bills, 
whereas those in the fourth quartile report expenditures 0.4 times of their bills.  
While the magnitude of estimates is different, the stated WTP estimates for 50 
percent and total elimination of outages show a similar pattern to the revealed WTP 
estimates across quartiles19. An interesting pattern reveals when looking at the breakdown 
of total WTP values. Although a 50 percent reduction in outages in each step theoretically 
provides equal units of electricity, households value the second increment differently. The 
incremental WTP for 100 percent reduction varies across different quartiles of bills (row 
2b in Table 1.3). Households in the first quartile are willing to pay a further 74 percent of 
their current electricity bills, while those in the fourth quartile are willing to pay only an 
additional 40 percent.  
                                                          
19 In the sample of households, 4 percent of respondents (72 respondents) stated zero willingness 
to pay for service improvements. Looking at the observable characteristics of this group, it is clear 
that zero bids are stated by those at lower income categories. So, it is assumed here that these 
bidders represent valid zero bids rather than protest zeros, which would arise if respondents have 
stated a zero WTP even though their true valuation was positive. 
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 The same exercise is repeated for the firms’ sample (see Table 1.4)20. The average 
coping expenditures for a representative firm amounts to a premium of 79 percent on the 
electricity bill. Once the sample is split by electricity tariff categories, a pattern of scale 
economies in off-grid coping expenditures is observable among firms, with the relative 
coping expenditures of industrial firms being less than domestic and commercial firms’. 
The stated WTP for a 50 percent reduction in outages by firms suggests a similar pattern 
to the revealed WTP estimates among firms. However, the stated WTP for the total 
elimination of planned outages indicates a change in the opposite direction: the average 
WTP stated by firms with industrial tariffs is 50 and 30 percent greater than the WTP by 
firms with domestic and commercial tariffs, respectively.  
These obtained WTP estimates provide two insights about the cost of interruptions to 
electricity consumers. First, the sustained availability of electricity is valued 
heterogeneously between residential and non-residential consumers. Second, even within 
the same category of consumers, the reliability of electricity service is valued differently. 
The next step is to test the associations between the obtained WTP values and observable 
                                                          
20 In the firms’ sample, two percent of respondents (15 firms) stated zero willingness to pay for the 
proposed improvements. Previous studies suggest that zero bids (also known as protest bids) should 
be considered legitimate WTP bids when respondents value a proposed policy, as opposed to when 
they value a commodity (McGuirk, Stephenson and Taylor, 1989; Oseni, 2017). Moreover, as 
Carlsson and Martinsson (2007) argue, if there is no further information about the protest, they 
should be treated as true zeros since we cannot rule out a WTP equal to zero. Following these 
arguments, I included zero WTP responses by firms. The estimated WTP without zero responses 
are, on average, 11 percent, 18 percent, and 15 percent lower for firms under domestic, commercial, 
and industrial electricity tariffs, respectively. Moreover, I tested the robustness of the regression 
coefficients represented in Table 1.7 by estimating a Tobit model. The Tobit model’s results 
indicate that while the sizes of the coefficients change slightly, their signs do not show any 
sensitivity to the regression model’s choice. 
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characteristics of respondents to see what observable characteristics of electricity 
consumers should be taken into account to avoid the increased provision of energy to those 
who do not seek it. 
Panels A and B in Figure 1.5 depict the regression coefficients by quartiles of 
households’ electricity bills and firms’ electricity tariff categories, respectively. The 
absolute value of stated WTP by households in higher quartiles of electricity bills does not 
significantly differ from those in lower quartiles. The relative WTP values, however, 
decrease significantly from lower to higher quartiles. At first glance, this might imply that 
households in higher quartiles put a lower value on improvements in the electricity system 
reliability. However, this counterintuitive finding can be explained by a closer look at the 
resale value of coping equipment and the coping equipment’s adoption patterns across 
quartiles. 
Households in higher quartiles of electricity bills are more likely to invest in inverters 
and voltage stabilizers (see Table 1.6). Among available backup technologies, only 
inverters have enough capacity to power large-load appliances (e.g., refrigerators and 
washing machines) beyond lights, radios, and mobile phone chargers. Also, voltage 
stabilizers can insure the large-load sensitive electric appliances against voltage 
fluctuations. With such complementary off-grid equipment, high-demand households are 
able to consume almost as much as electricity units they desire even without proposed 
improvements. For them, the inconvenience may be simply rescheduling power-
consuming activities. These technologies are also associated with high sunk investment 
costs and most likely have a low ratio of resale value to purchase value. A fully reliable 
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grid, however, provides a reliability level above and beyond any equipment. Thus, higher 
quartile households are willing to pay a positive but smaller fraction of their current bill to 
reduce outages further. 
On the other hand, given the low demand for electricity services among lower quartiles 
of bills, their WTP for reliable electricity is insufficient to cover the high upfront and 
routine maintenance costs of inverters and voltage stabilizers. Hence, it is not surprising 
that lower quartile households are more likely to use kerosene to cope with unreliable 
electricity service (see Table 1.6). However, kerosene provides low-quality lighting with 
an expected possibility of burn injuries for household members (Daltrop and Mulqueeny, 
2010). Also, they cannot turn on the radio or TV or charge their mobile phones during 
blackouts. Therefore, they might be willing to pay a relatively higher fraction of their 
current bill to eliminate outages’ risks and inconvenience. 
In Panel B of Figure 1.5, it is shown that an incremental improvement in reliability 
from 50 percent to 100 percent is valued more by both commercial and industrial firms, 
but only statistically significant for industrial firms. This behavior among firms can be 
explained by the nature of coping behavior among industrial firms. As shown in Table 1.8, 
industrial firms invest in backup generators and voltage stabilizers because of their needs 
for higher loads and their equipment’s high sensitivity to voltage fluctuations. The 
reliability level that these consumers require cannot be provided by other off-grid 
equipment such as intermittent solar panels. However, the cost of running backup 
generators is so high that these firms cannot operate 24 hours (as they usually do to avoid 
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ramp-up times or to meet manufacturing requirements) if they decide to self-generate all 
their required electricity.  
When a 50 percent reduction in outages is proposed, these firms still need to keep their 
installed backup capacity, but they save partially in generator’s operating costs (fuel for 
generators). Given that industrial firms benefit from the economies of scale in self-
generation, their savings in operating costs after service improvements are relatively less 
than commercial and domestic categories. On the other hand, when outages due to 
electricity shortages are entirely eliminated, firms may decide to remove all or a large 
fraction of their installed backup capacity. In other words, they are not only able to save all 
the operating costs, but they are also able to save substantially on the fixed capital costs as 
well as high routine maintenance costs. These savings add up to potential increases in 
revenues from higher utilization rates due to increased consumption of electricity services. 
The value of these gains ranks industrial consumers first, with the highest WTP for outage-
free electricity service. 
The impacts of other household-level characteristics on WTP values are listed in Table 
1.5. Household income is expected to correlate with electricity demand (Sievert and 
Steinbuks, 2020) positively. Column 1 of Table 1.5 shows a positive correlation between 
households’ electricity bills and income levels. This is most likely driven by the ownership 
of high-power electric appliances (such as refrigerators and washing machines) that higher-
income households use to do household chores. The relationship between income and WTP 




Also, households with at least one kid at school stated a higher WTP for reliability 
improvements. As the household head’s educational attainment increases, the WTP for the 
total elimination of outages increases. Lee et al. (2020) argue that the impact of 
electrification is a direct function of a household’s ability to make complementary 
investments to realize the potential benefits of electrification. Parents with school kids and 
household heads with higher education attainment put a higher value on reliability because 
more electricity reliability can increase their expected benefits from the investments they 
have made in their kids and their education. 
Similarly, other firm-level characteristics are expected to affect their current and future 
electricity demand once reliability is improved. As represented in Table 1.7, firms under 
commercial and industrial electricity tariff categories currently consume significantly more 
electric power than domestic ones. Firm size is a predictor of current electricity demand 
and absolute WTP for improvements. And, firms located in rural areas state a significantly 
higher WTP for the total elimination of outages, both in absolute and relative terms. 
1.6 Comparing ex-post electricity consumption with predictions of ex-ante WTP 
estimates 
The Nepal-India Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (NIETTP) was proposed 
in 2011 to expand cross-border transmission capacity between India and Nepal. With the 
development of different phases of NIETTP, Nepal has been able to import additional 
power from India from 2017. NEA has been able to serve the residential consumers without 
any load shedding since 2017. Non-residential load shedding, however, continued partially 
until early 2018, when the project became fully operational. The survey used in this study 
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is conducted right before this project came into service. The WTP estimates predict that 
industrial consumers put the highest value on the sustained supply of electricity. The 
validity of this prediction can be tested by ex-post changes in electricity consumption levels 
after 2016. 
In 2016, NEA served 3,257,812 customers, 93.8 percent under domestic tariff, 0.6 
percent under commercial tariff, and 1.4 percent under industrial electricity tariff21. Sales 
to these three categories were more than 88 percent of total MWh sold by NEA, totaling 
USD 0.4 billion of revenues. Domestic consumers comprise 42 percent of these revenues, 
followed by industrial and commercial consumers with 35 and 11 percent, respectively.  
Figure 1.6 depicts the electricity consumption growth index for domestic, commercial, 
and industrial customers from 2010 through 2018, with 2016 as the base year22. Each year’s 
index value is constructed as the ratio of GWh of electricity sold to each consumer category 
in that year to GWh of electricity sold to that category in 2016. The index is also adjusted 
for the growth rate in the number of consumers to ensure that it represents the average 
change in consumption level for each category over time. Industrial customers have the 
highest ex-post increase in electricity consumption, as predicted by the ex-ante WTP. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies’ findings that grid expansion has an aggregate 
                                                          
21 The other 4.2 percent included supply of power for public usage such as street lights, temples, 
irrigation and water supply. 
  




impact on industrial development (Kassem, 2018; Khanna and Rowe, 2020; Fried and 
Lagakos, 2020; Perez-Sebastian et al., 2020; Fiszbein et al., 2020). 
1.7 Conclusion 
This study contributes to the growing discussions of how increased electricity 
availability from new generation capacity or power imports can improve electrification 
policies’ effectiveness in low-income, energy-poor contexts. These upstream energy 
interventions can facilitate moving beneficiaries to relatively higher electricity 
consumption tiers since the shortfall in electricity availability has locked them into a lower 
tier of access despite being connected to the grid (Bhatia and Angelou, 2015). Using a 
representative sample of electricity customers in Nepal, I find substantial heterogeneity in 
ex-ante demand for an improved electricity supply and an ex-post increase in electricity 
consumption levels, even within the same tariff categories.  
The estimates reported in this paper indicate that focusing only on aggregate coping 
expenditures or stated WTP for proposed improvement may lead to under- or over-
estimation demand for reliability among different categories of consumers. While energy 
supplied by off-grid backup technologies can be used during periods of supply 
interruptions, there is still inconvenience among electricity consumers caused by public 
infrastructure’s insufficiency. Households need to reschedule their routine activities, and 
firms cannot utilize their full capacity. The value of this remaining inconvenience is not 
reflected in consumers’ coping expenditures and shows up only in the stated WTP values 




For policy-making purposes, the findings highlight the importance of understanding 
which categories of electricity customers will most likely benefit from electricity reliability 
improvements. An unreliable supply of electricity from the grid can be expected to impose 
varying levels of welfare cost depending on the household’s socioeconomic characteristics. 
Similarly, business enterprises may be affected differently based on their opportunity costs 
of unsupplied power. Thus, a detailed analysis of households’ preferences and firms’ 
opportunity costs is necessary for electricity utilities and policymakers to evaluate the 
benefits from reliability investments properly. Even if investments cannot be made and 
rationing has to be done, such information allows the decision making process for utilities 
by ranking customer groups based on their costs of per kWh unserved when the electric 


























      
Monthly grid electricity bill      
USD 5.73 0.76 1.93 4.59 15.82 
 (8.13) (0.14) (0.59) (1.14) (10.95) 
Household characteristics       
Number of household members 5.14 4.91 4.89 5.22 5.58 
 (2.42) (2.30) (2.23) (2.26) (2.71) 
      
Number of rooms in the house 5.59 4.15 5.00 5.50 7.75 
 (3.15) (2.08) (2.62) (2.94) (3.60) 
      
Have at least one school kid (aged 6-14) 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.53 
      
Owns a TV/radio 0.85 0.64 0.86 0.94 0.98 
Owns a computer 0.35 0.08 0.28 0.38 0.68 
      
Educational attainment of the household head      
No formal education 0.20 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.09 
Less than School Leaving Certificate (SLC*) 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.39 
SLC 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.17 
More than SLC 0.23 0.12 0.18 0.27 0.35 
      
Household income      
Category 1: Less than NPR 10K (USD 95) 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.01 
Category 2: Between NPR 10K to 20K (USD 95 to 190) 0.23 0.35 0.27 0.21 0.09 
Category 3: Between NPR 20K to 40K (USD 190 to 381) 0.37 0.30 0.42 0.40 0.35 
Category 4: Between NPR 40K to 60K (USD 381 to 571) 0.21 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.31 
Category 5: More than NPR 60K to 80K (USD 571) 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.22 
      
Urban/rural status and ecological zones      
Urban – Kathmandu 0.22 0.02 0.18 0.23 0.45 
Urban – Outside Kathmandu 0.34 0.24 0.27 0.44 0.39 
Rural – Terai 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.22 0.06 
Rural – Mountain  0.22 0.46 0.23 0.10 0.09 
      
Coping technology      
Inverters 0.19 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.47 
Solar panel 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.16 
Solar lantern 0.01 0.02 - 0.01 - 
Voltage stabilizer 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.23 
Torch lights 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.43 
Emergency lights 0.48 0.42 0.54 0.51 0.43 
Candle 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.15 
Kerosene 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.09 0.03 
      
Standard deviation in parentheses. 









(n = 589) 
Electricity Tariff Category 
Domestic 
(n = 144) 
Commercial 
(n = 153) 
Industrial 
(n = 292) 
     
Monthly grid electricity bill     
USD 2,539 82 175 4,164 
 (6,122) (168) (5,272) (7,432) 
     
Firm size (based on annual gross sales)     
Small 0.46 0.67 0.58 0.29 
Medium 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.43 
Large 0.16 0.02 0.09 0.28 
     
Firm location     
Urban 0.81 0.95 0.89 0.06 
Rural 0.19 0.05 0.11 0.84 
     
Adoption of coping technology     
Inverter 0.72 0.79 0.81 0.65 
Diesel generators 0.68 0.24 0.78 0.84 
Voltage stabilizer 0.34 0.19 0.34 0.42 
Solar panel 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.04 
     



















Quartiles of monthly electricity bills 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  
       
Stated preference Contingent valuation      
(1) 
WTP for 50% reduction in planned 
outages* 
39.91 43.55 41.85 42.27 32.56 
  (1.09) (3.06) (2.09) (2.03) (1.79) 
       
(2) Incremental WTP for 100% reduction 
in planned outages** 
54.57 75.30 57.10 49.55 39.61 
  (1.07) (3.29) (2.08) (1.80) (1.44) 
       
(3) 
Total WTP for elimination of planned 
outages 
94.48 118.86 98.97 91.83 72.18 
  (2.08) (6.67) (4.29) (3.44) (2.76) 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Notes:  
* If a respondent chooses to pay an additional amount for 50% fewer outages, the base figure is calculated 
as the current bill multiplied by the accepted offered value (the final accepted bid). For instance, if the current 
bill is USD 50 and the respondent’s final accepted bid is 30%, the WTP value for 50% reduction in outages 
is recorded as USD 15, or 30% of the current electricity bill (reported in row 1). 
** If the respondent chooses to pay an additional amount for no outages in the follow-up question, then the 
base figure is recorded as the current bill multiplied by random offered value plus recorded WTP for 50% 
fewer outages. For instance, if the current bill is USD 50 and the final accepted bid for the total elimination 
of outages is 60%, the WTP value for the total elimination of outages is recorded as USD 30 + USD 15 = 
USD 45, or 90% of the current electricity bill (reported in row 3). The incremental WTP for 100% reduction 














Electricity Tariff Category 
Domestic Commercial Industrial 
      
Stated 
preference 
Contingent valuation   
   
(1) WTP for 50% reduction in planned outages 37.23 41.56 37.20 34.27 
  (1.87) (3.21) (3.70) (2.83) 
      
(2) Incremental WTP for 100% reduction in planned 
outages 
71.97 53.68 66.60 84.83 
  (2.45) (2.94) (4.68) (4.11) 
      
(3) Total WTP for elimination of planned outages 109.21 95.25 103.81 119.10 
  (4.96) (4.93) (9.29) (8.73) 

















Table 1.5: Determinants of current and future demand for electricity – households’ 
sample 
Variables 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Distribution of grid electricity bills       
2nd quartile  - 0.58 0.11 - 0.14*** - 0.21*** 
  (0.37) (0.18) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
3rd quartile  - 0.09 0.29 - 0.20*** - 0.31*** 
  (0.40) (0.20) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
4th quartile  - 1.20*** 0.26 - 0.38*** - 0.48*** 
  (0.45) (0.22) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household monthly income       
Category 2 (between USD 95 to 190) 0.19** 1.88*** 0.90*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 
 (0.08) (0.53) (0.26) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Category 3 (between USD 190 to 381) 0.25*** 2.29*** 1.42*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 
 (0.08) (0.53) (0.26) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Category 4 (between USD 381 to 571) 0.43*** 2.82*** 1.71*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 
 (0.09) (0.57) (0.28) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Category 5 (more than USD 571) 0.48*** 2.35*** 2.08*** 0.25*** 0.36*** 
 (0.10) (0.63) (0.31) (0.05) (0.05) 
Urban/Rural status       
      
Urban – Outside Kathmandu - 0.15** - 1.96*** - 0.96*** - 0.15*** - 0.10*** 
 (0.06) (0.38) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Rural – Terai - 0.59*** - 1.84*** - 0.34 - 0.19*** - 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.46) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Rural – Mountain - 0.83*** - 5.68*** - 1.24*** - 0.46*** - 0.16*** 
 (0.06) (0.44) (0.22) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household characteristics      
Number of household members 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 - 0.0005 - 0.0007 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.0048) (0.0046) 
      
Number of rooms in the house 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.04* 0.009** 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.004) (0.003) 
      
Have at least one school kid (aged 6-14) - 0.03 0.45* 0.17 0.04* 0.05** 
 (0.04) (0.27) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Ownership of TV/Radio 0.44*** 0.11 0.22 - 0.02 - 0.0006 
 (0.06) (0.38) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Ownership of computer 0.48*** 0.30 0.25 0.01 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.32) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) 
Educational attainment of the household head      
Less than SLC 0.07 0.19 0.31* 0.03 0.06** 
 (0.05) (0.33) (0.16) (0.02) (0.03) 
      
SLC 0.09 0.22 0.27 0.01 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.48) (0.22) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
More than SLC 0.08 - 0.20 0.59*** - 0.01 0.11*** 
 (0.06) (0.41) (0.20) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 











Inverter Voltage stabilizer 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quartiles of electricity bills      
2nd quartile 0.06* 0.04 - 0.04* 0.02 - 0.07*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
      
3rd quartile 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.004 - 0.01 - 0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
      
4th quartile 0.20*** 0.14*** - 0.03 - 0.06** - 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
      
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 
* p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.  Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Average marginal effects of Probit model are reported.  














Table 1.7: Determinants of current and future demand for electricity – firms’ sample 
Variable 
Current demand Absolute WTP, log(WTP) 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Electricity Tariff category      
Commercial 1.92*** 0.54 2.06*** - 7.27 7.35 
 (0.15) (0.74) (0.30) (5.18) (6.53) 
      
Industrial 3.31*** 1.17** 3.84*** - 13.15** 19.27*** 
 (0.15) (0.73) (0.30) (5.96) (6.49) 
      
Firm size       
Medium 0.67*** 1.89*** 0.92*** 8.93** 1.75 
 (0.13) (0.60) (0.25) (4.16) (5.36) 
      
Large 1.96*** 3.25*** 1.88*** 14.96** - 6.29 
 (0.17) (0.82) (0.34) (5.72) (7.35) 
      
Rural - 0.14 - 1.34* 1.02*** - 3.47 21.98*** 
 (0.15) (0.71) (0.31) (4.96) (6.63) 
      
Observations 589 589 589 589 589 
      




















Inverter Solar panel 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Electricity tariff category     
Commercial 0.36*** 0.16*** 0.03 - 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
     
Industrial 0.36*** 0.22*** - 0.12** - 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Firm size     
Medium 0.12*** 0.09** 0.02 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
     
Large 0.22*** 0.03 0.03 0.001 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Firm location     
Rural 0.07 - 0.04 - 0.04 - 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
     
Observations 589 589 589 589 

















Panel A: Variation in average monthly rainfall in 2016 
 
Panel B: Variation in hydroelectricity generation in 2016 
Figure 1.1: Seasonal variations in average rainfall and hydroelectricity generation in 2016 
Note: Months are categorized into monsoon and dry months. The first six months represent the monsoon season (Jestha 
through Kartik in Nepalese calendar, mid-May through mid-Nov), and the second six months refer to the dry season 
(Kartik through Baishakh in Nepalese calendar, mid-Nov through mid-May). Data sources: The rainfall data are from the 
World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal. Monthly generation values are from Annual reports of the Nepal 





Figure 1.2: Hydroelectricity generation in Nepal during 2011-2016 
 





















































































































































































































































Figure 1.3: Ecological zones used for the sampling 
















Panel A: High demanders 
 
Panel B: Low demanders 







Panel A: households’ WTP by quartiles of electricity bills (reference category: 1st quartile) 
 
 
Panel B: Firms’ WTP by electricity tariff categories (reference category: domestic) 
 





Figure 1.6: GWh of electricity sold over time (adjusted for growth in the number of 
consumers, base year = 2016) 
Note: The base year for growth index is selected as 2016 because: (a) the WTP survey was conducted in 
2016; (b) load shedding for domestic consumers and all consumers have been eliminated since 2017 and 














































  CHAPTER 2 
THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF MITIGATING UNPLANNED OUTAGES IN 
OVERLOADED ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS 
2.1 Introduction 
In many developing countries, insufficient investments or seasonal shortages in the 
upstream segments of the electricity supply chain (generation and transmission) result in 
long hours of electricity service unavailability (Zhang, 2018). Electric utilities in these 
countries typically allocate the constrained supply of electricity among customers through 
rationing programs (also known as load shedding programs). Outages caused by these 
programs are called planned outages, and previous studies show that there is often a 
significant willingness to pay among consumers to eliminate planned outages (Ozbafli & 
Jenkins, 2016; Carlsson et al., 2020; Niroomand & Jenkins, 2020; Hashemi, 2021). 
There are, in addition, situations where sufficient electricity is generated and 
transmitted to distribution networks (the downstream segment of the electricity supply 
chain), but frequent unplanned outages remain. Local substation failure due to capacity 
overload is the most common cause of unplanned outages23. Electric utilities upgrade 
substation capacities to keep up with growing demand over time and to prevent or reduce 
                                                          
23 A distribution substation is the last part of the electricity distribution network that ensures electric 
power is adequately converted to a usable service voltage for the daily operations of consumers. 
Each substation is designed for a specific maximum capacity, and the installed protection devices 
automatically shut down the substation in the occurrence of an overload, leaving all consumers 
connected to that substation without power. Thus, the frequency with which unplanned power 




overloading. The cost of such investments is recovered from adjustments to retail 
electricity prices (EIA, 2017).  
There is political pressure against higher electricity prices in many developing 
countries’ electricity markets, and the situation gets worse where access to electricity is 
increasingly viewed as a right. Unaccounted electricity usage (electricity theft) through 
illegal connections and unpaid electricity bills becomes an accepted part of the system 
(Burgess et al., 2020). Consequently, electric utilities’ cash flows deteriorate, and they 
postpone essential investments to maintain service reliability (Gertler et al., 2017). 
Distribution substations are not only essential parts of power distribution from an 
electrical engineering perspective, but they also play a critical role in the economics of 
power distribution. When reliability concerns are significant, the electric power drawn 
from a substation has common-pool resource (CPR) aspects (Pless & Fell, 2017). Once 
consumers are connected to the electric network, although their kWh consumption can be 
individually metered it is impossible to precisely monitor their individual contributions to 
overloading. The CPR problem arises when individual users draw electricity from a 
substation without paying a market price that reflects the marginal cost of technical or 
economic sustainability. 
While CPR problems have gained significant attention in the management of natural 
resources such as fishery, grazing areas, and forestry, research on electricity infrastructure 
as a CPR has mainly been conceptual (Künneke & Finger, 2009) and rarely informed by 
empirical evidence. This study uses a nationally representative sample of Nepalese firms 
to investigate the extent to which electricity distribution networks face commons problems. 
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The ownership boundaries of substation configurations are used to identify how CPR 
problems at local distribution substations affect the aggregate level of reliability, and to 
estimate the extent to which private ownership of a substation enables a firm to mitigate 
those problems.  
The data analyzed in this paper indicate that firms with captive substations are less 
likely to experience unplanned outages24. In particular, firms with private substations are 
less likely than firms with shared substations to report the occurrence of unplanned power 
outages. If these firms report unplanned outages, they are less frequent and have shorter 
durations than those experienced by firms without their own substations. These findings 
are then used to study the feasibility of investing in a captive substation for a firm (or a 
group of firms) as a mitigation strategy to address outages caused by overloaded 
substations. Estimates of the firms’ willingness to pay to reduce unplanned outages are 
used to estimate the potential economic gains from deregulation of private substation 
provision. I estimate that the benefits from deregulation of substation ownership would 
generate substantial economic gains to Nepal’s economy, up to 18.17 USD billion as of 
2016. 
Understanding the heterogeneous impacts of outages and proposing practical solutions 
to address them is useful to decision-makers when designing policies to address 
distribution networks’ reliability issues. While expanding upstream generation and 
transmission capacities can effectively eliminate planned outages, the situation for 
                                                          
24 A captive substation is a distribution substation used and managed by an industrial or commercial 
electricity consumer for their own electricity consumption. 
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addressing unplanned outages in the downstream segment is a fundamentally different 
problem. The localized nature of these outages implies that the potential solutions should 
also be local. Private investment in distribution substations by a firm or a group of firms is 
a possible solution to the problems caused by local overloads.  
2.2 Literature review: electricity reliability as a common-pool resource 
Electricity distribution networks can be viewed as rivalrous but non-excludable 
resources for at least three reasons (Künneke & Finger, 2009). First, electricity distribution 
infrastructures are often spread over a vast geographical area with difficult-to-monitor 
access points, making them susceptible to the actions taken by interconnected electricity 
consumers. An example of such actions is the pilferage of electricity through illegal tapping 
of the low-voltage distribution lines leaving a substation. Empirical evidence suggests that 
electricity theft can adversely affect electricity reliability, which is why reducing electricity 
theft has been recognized as one of the potential solutions for improved electricity 
reliability (Jamil, 2013; Tang, 2014; PWC, 2016). 
Another source of reduced local electricity reliability is present when a new enterprise 
gains connectivity to a distribution substation that already bears a load equal to its rated 
capacity. The new connection to an already-at-capacity substation leads to more outages. 
Such a large new connection can only happen by bribing the electric utility authorities who 
control access to such substations. The new enterprise will have found the bribe worthwhile 
to obtain some grid-supplied electricity service of whatever quality given the high cost of 
self-generated electricity, while the reliability of service is reduced for everyone connected 
to that substation (Gertler et al., 2017; Pless and Fell, 2017). Energy sector assessment 
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reports by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) highlight corruption as one of the 
significant issues affecting electricity reliability (ADB, 2007; ADB 2009). 
Third, even if grid access could be technically monitored, there might be politically 
motivated universal-access obligations. Access to electricity is increasingly viewed as a 
right across the developing world. In such an environment, illegal connections have 
become an accepted part of the electricity distribution system (Burgess et al., 2020). This 
social norm will eventually result in reduced reliability of the electricity distributed by the 
utility. Those who are legally connected will have to pay higher electricity bills in order 
for the utility to recover the costs of maintaining reliability. If retail electricity tariffs are 
regulated and there is resistance to higher tariffs, the electric utility’s cash flow deteriorates, 
leading the utility to postpone essential investments to maintain reliability, leading to 
reduced reliability for all customers (ADB, 2011; Gertler et al., 2017). 
Fourth, once users have entered the network, it might be difficult or even impossible 
to determine the services they appropriate from it. Although individual kWh consumption 
can be precisely metered, certain critical services to technically balance the electricity 
network (i.e., load balancing, voltage control, and reactive power) cannot be. This rivalrous 
nature of reliability is particularly prominent when the network is congested during peak 
demand periods. There is a need for load management, voltage control, and reactive power 
provision. However, different use patterns and the technical characteristics of users’ 
applications cause different demands for these services. Individual users extract these 
services from the system without paying the full cost of their technical and economic 
sustainability (Künneke, R., & Finger, 2009; Melville et al., 2017). 
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2.3 Cost-benefit analysis of deregulating distribution substations 
Private investments in substations can either be made by an individual firm or by a 
group of firms. Third parties can also make such investments and serves as intermediaries 
between the electric utility and firms. For them, it is of great importance to analyze whether 
the electricity users would find it worthwhile to pay a substation owner a high enough price 
to turn that substation into a profitable business25. In either case, the framework below can 
be used to quantify the costs and benefits of investments in substations.   
2.3.1 Accumulated savings by reducing per kWh charge  
Private ownership of a distribution substation is not a new idea. It has been a common 
practice worldwide for large consumers, especially those with high electricity loads 
(primarily large commercial and industrial facilities). For instance, in the United States 
firms can purchase an existing substation from the utility, install a new one themselves, or 
partner with third-party providers (Interstates, 2020).  If a substation is purchased from the 
utility, a cost estimate is provided by the utility based on factors such as size, age, and 
condition. If the utility does not make the substation available, or the firm wants to install 
a new one, the firm may directly request quotes. In a partnership, a third party owns the 
substation, buys electricity from the utility, and provides it to other firms. This partnership 
allows the client firms to avoid capital costs while getting the benefits of metering at a 
higher service voltage. Regardless of the option chosen, insurance coverage for service 
                                                          
25 In case of substation privatization, institutional arrangements should be considered in order to 
avoid the hold-up problem from technological interdependencies in different production stages. 
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reliability is provided by the firm and the utility for their respective facilities as part of 
ordinary course of doing business.  
The utility often owns and maintains distribution substations. After receiving 
electricity from transmission lines in high voltages, distribution substations reduce the 
voltage of supply to desired levels for each category of consumers. Depending on how 
many voltage-reduction steps the electricity supply passes through, the electric utility 
charges a higher rate per kWh after each step to recover the ownership costs of distribution 
substations (see Figure 2.2). If a customer decides to purchase power at a higher voltage, 
the utility charges a lower per kWh rate. In such cases the customer must install and 
maintain its own substation to step down the voltage before final use.  
For consumers with high demand for electric service, the present value of the cash 
savings on their electricity bills due to the lower per kWh cost of high voltage electricity 
is often sufficient to pay off the capital and maintenance costs of a distribution substation 
over its lifetime. Table 2.1 shows that the differences in NEA’s retail electricity prices by 
voltage and tariff categories. The average savings after switching to high voltage are 2.76 
and 2.24 US cents per kWh for low- and medium-voltage connections, respectively. These 
savings are equivalent to 28 and 24 percent of the initial tariff rate for low- and medium-
voltage consumers. The savings per kWh and the firm’s average annual kWh of electricity 
consumption are the main determinants of the present value of benefits from tariff savings 
over a substation’s economic life. 
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2.3.2 Value of lost production due to power outages 
The unexpected nature of unplanned outages combined with their shorter duration 
makes them more detrimental than planned outages to firms’ operations. When a planned 
outage occurs, firms can take various precautions to reduce the costs of service 
interruptions (Munasinghe & Gellerson, 1979; Sanghvi, 1982). For instance, proper 
equipment shutdown prevents damage to equipment and spoilage of production inputs and 
outputs. Similarly, labor employment can be curtailed if the production stops in a planned 
manner (Hashemi et al., 2018). However, in the case of an unplanned outage, the degree of 
losses depends on the flexibility of production inputs (Allcott et al., 2016). 
The savings per kWh tariff rates are the lower bound of the substation ownership 
benefits in a high distribution-loss environment like Nepal. The possibility of reducing 
power failures by installing a captive substation is also a tangible benefit item for firms in 
the form of saved production time. The value of forgone production per kWh of unsupplied 
electricity is the measure for quantifying this benefit category. Contribution-margin 
analysis is a valuable tool for this purpose, given that firm managers typically use it to 
compare planned and actual operations (Warren et al., 2013; Galo, 2017). The contribution 
margin (i.e., the difference between price and average variable cost) is the portion of sales 
revenues covering fixed costs and earning a profit after direct variable costs are deducted. 
It is equivalent to a short-run producer surplus. A firm maximizes its profits by maximizing 
its contribution and continues to conduct its business in the short run as long as the 
contribution is positive, even during circumstances when profits would be negative in the 
long run.  
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Thus, a firm can use contribution-margin analysis to evaluate the opportunity cost of 
unplanned power outages, since the value of forgone production during the outage period 
is the contribution margin that would have been realized if the unit had actually been 
produced. 
The contribution margin for firm i can be estimated as 




where R is sales revenue, 𝑐𝑚 is the cost of raw materials, 𝑐𝑒 is the cost of electricity, and 
𝑐𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 is other direct costs such as maintenance, repairs, and packaging. Due to the 
unexpected nature of unplanned outages there are often other cost components borne by 
firms. Most firms do not have a flexible labor force that can be released from work for the 
outage period to save direct labor costs. In-process material spoilage is another cost 
component for some firms.  
Once these two costs are taken into account, the total cost of power outages for firm 
i (𝐶𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
) can be obtained as shown in Equation 4, 
 𝐶𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
= ∑ [𝑑𝑗 + 𝜇(𝑑𝑗)] . 𝐶𝑀𝑖
𝑓
𝑗=1 + (𝑆𝑉𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝑖)  (2) 
where 𝑑𝑗 is the outage duration, 𝜇(𝑑𝑗) is the re-start time for an outage duration 𝑑𝑗, f is the 
frequency of outages per annum, 𝑆𝐶𝑖 is the spoilage costs, and 𝑆𝑉𝑖 is the salvage value of 
spoiled material-in-process. Using the total cost of power outages and the number of kWhs 
not supplied, the levelized cost of power outages can be estimated for each individual firm. 
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Estimating Equation 2 for firms in the sample requires access to detailed information 
from firms’ operating accounts. Such information is available for a comprehensive set of 
firms in Nepal from the 2011 National Census of Manufacturing Establishments (latest 
available for Nepal at the time of this study). The national census collects detailed 
information about the aggregate value of inputs used and the output produced by different 
industries. The contribution value per kWh is estimated for a selected list of sectors and 
reported in Table 2.2. Sales revenues are not directly reported in the census data, but the 
value of output can be used as an approximation for sale revenues.  
Contribution values per kWh range from 0.51 to 2.94USD/kWh. These estimates 
clearly show that even without accounting for the cost of idle labor and material spoilage 
contribution values per kWh are significant. The estimated contribution values are in the 
range of 0.28 to 2.88 USD/kWh reported in Hashemi et al. (2018). They employ three years 
of hourly data on power outage occurrences for three Nepalese manufacturing firms. 
Estimates of contribution values indicate that even if the savings in tariff differences would 
not be sufficient for a firm to justify an investment in a substation, the additional benefits 
from reducing the value of lost production might make the investment profitable to the 
firm. The extent to which the avoided loss in production time contributes to substation 






2.3.3 The impact of substation ownership on electricity reliability  
The following specification is used to estimate the impact of substation ownership on 
firm i’s experienced level of electricity reliability,  
 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛼𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is a measure of electricity reliability for firm i, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the 
voltage at which firm i receives electricity from the grid (low, medium, or high), 𝛼𝑟 are 
electric utility regional distribution center fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. The voltage 
of connection is a proxy for exposure to externalities in the distribution network. 
 Three different measures of reliability are tested here. The first measure is whether 
the firm reports frequent unplanned outages (experienced outages daily as opposed to a 
weekly or monthly basis). The dependent variable equals one if the answer is “Yes” and 0 
if “No.” The central assumption here is that frequent unplanned outages reported by a firm 
relative to other firms in the same distribution center imply that the substation from which 
the firm draws electricity experiences more failures due to overloading, and therefore more 
outages. 
The second measure of electricity reliability is the frequency of unplanned daily 
outages. Power outages could be due to failures at other segments rather than distribution 
(e.g., the transmission segment). If a firm reports a higher frequency of unplanned daily 
outages than other firms being supplied by the same distribution center, that difference is 
most likely attributable to heterogeneities in reliability at the distribution-substation level.  
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The third measure of reliability tested is the duration of the most extended unplanned 
outage. Technical studies show that if a substation is overloaded more frequently, it not 
only becomes more susceptible to failures over time but it also takes longer for that 
substation to be brought back online after an outage (ADB, 2020a). It is expected that firms 
with captive substations would report shorter-duration outages than those with shared 
substations. 
2.3.4 Investment appraisal of a captive substation as a mitigation strategy 
The net present value (NPV) of investing in a captive substation for firm i can be 
expressed as 
 




𝑙𝑜𝑤) × 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖,𝑡] + [𝐶𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒




where 𝑟 is the discount rate, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
 and 𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑙𝑜𝑤 are the tariff rates per kWh charged by the 
electric utility for high- and low-voltage connections, 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the average kWh of power 
consumption per hour, 𝐻𝑖,𝑡is annual hours of power consumption, 𝐶𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
 is the levelized 
cost of outages for firm i, and ℎ is averted hours of power outages for firm i due to having 
a captive substation26. The analysis covers a period of 10 years (𝑇 = 10), which is the 
substation’s economic life. It is also assumed that the benefits of a captive substation will 
begin to be realized in the second year of the investment because the construction of the 
substation and its transmission lines takes one year to be completed. 
                                                          
26 It is assumed in the base case that the electricity reliability remains the same for the period of 
this analysis. Later in this section, an analysis is carried out to identify the breakeven hours of 
outages below which the investment is not financially feasible for the firm. 
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2.4 Data and methodology 
2.4.1 Nepal’s power sector data 
Hydropower represents ninety percent of the total installed generation capacity in 
Nepal, mostly run-of-the-river type. With river flow being governed by the monsoon and 
dry seasons, Nepal experiences significant generation capacity deficits during the dry 
season (winter months) when electricity demand is at its peak. In response to low dry-
season hydropower generation, the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), the central 
government-owned generator, grid operator and distributor, has used a load curtailment 
program (known as load shedding).  
Insufficient upstream capacity has not been the only challenge in Nepal’s electricity 
sector. NEA’s annual reports show that even during the monsoon season with its abundance 
of hydropower availability, a significant amount of generated and transmitted electricity is 
lost in the distribution network. Despite NEA’s efforts to decrease the distribution losses, 
an average loss of 17 percent is reported across regional distribution centers in 2016 (NEA, 
2016). Technically speaking, a fraction of generated electricity inevitably gets lost in the 
transmission and distribution systems (known as technical losses). The magnitude of these 
losses can be minimized by proper design and timely maintenance of distribution 
substations. For instance, in the United States, it is estimated that only 5 percent of 
generated electricity was lost in transmission and distribution networks in 2014 through 
2018 (IEA, 2019). Three times more losses in Nepal’s distribution network than the 
combined losses in transmission and distribution losses in the United States imply that 
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there factors other than technical factors (non-technical factors) contribute to these 
substantial losses. 
A closer look at Nepal’s regional distribution centers reveals a noticeable 
heterogeneity in their losses. Eight regional centers across Nepal distribute electricity. Each 
of these centers is responsible for distributing the electricity transmitted by the national 
grid to a particular group of districts across the country (a total of 77 districts). The total 
megawatt-hours (MWh) received by each of the eight distribution centers (net of 
transmission loss) and the total MWhs billed by each center to its customers are extracted 
from NEA reports. For each center, the ratio of the difference between the two totals over 
total MWhs of transmitted electricity represents the percentage loss in the distribution 
network, as shown in Equation 5, 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 =  
𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑−𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
 . (5) 
 
As depicted in Figure 2.2, percentage losses across distribution centers ranged from as 
low as 10.24 percent to as high as 36.45 percent in 2016, when the firm-level data used in 
this study was collected. This variation suggests that the sample firms drew electricity from 
distribution networks with different electricity reliability levels.  
2.4.2 Firm-level data 
The firm-level data is obtained from a sample of 590 Nepalese firms surveyed in 
201627. The survey collected information about the voltage at which each firm purchased 
                                                          
27 The survey is conducted by the Millennium Challenge Corporation in partnership with the government of 




electricity from the national electric utility. This rich information facilitates the 
identification of each firm’s substation ownership. If a firm draws electricity from the grid 
at a primary voltage (i.e., high voltage), it means that the firm has to have a captive 
substation to step down the voltage before final use. Otherwise, drawing electricity at a 
secondary voltage (i.e., medium or low voltages), indicating that the firm is connected to a 
shared utility-owned substation. Although such information may be readily provided by a 
typical electric utility in a developed country, most electric utilities in developing countries, 
where unreliable access to electricity is prevalent, do not have detailed information beyond 
the transmission lines (Wijayatunga, & Siyambalapitiya, 2016). 
While each firm in the sample is connected to the same national grid, the voltage at 
which they receive electricity varies depending on their power needs. For instance, small 
service-sector firms might use electricity primarily for lighting purposes and powering 
appliances with low power requirements. Large industrial firms might use electricity as an 
input of production (such as cooling and heating raw materials or powering heavy 
equipment and machinery). Low voltage connections provide sufficient electricity for 
lighting purposes and running small electric appliances, but higher voltage connections are 
required for industrial purposes. Out of 590 firms in the sample, 435 firms have low-
voltage connections, 105 firms have medium-voltage connections, and 50 firms have high-
voltage connections. 
2.5 Results 
Table 2.3 presents the sample’s descriptive statistics. There are 50 firms in the sample 
with captive substations (high voltage connections). While 36 percent of firms with low 
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and medium voltage connections report unplanned outages daily, only 4 percent of firms 
with high-voltage connections have experienced unplanned daily outages. Also, firms with 
captive substations report fewer unplanned outages in a day, and they report a shorter 
duration for those outages. Table 2.3 shows a list of firms’ characteristics by voltage of 
connection. There are firms with different sizes across all voltage categories. Industrial 
firms mostly use medium and high voltage connections. 
Table 2.4 reports the regression results from estimating Equation 3. Firms with captive 
substations are 30 percent less likely to experience unplanned outages on a daily basis than 
firms with utility-owned shared substations (see column 1). The reason for this disparity is 
that firms with captive substations tend to be less exposed to the cumulative effect of 
distribution-line and substation overloads than firms with shared substations. Compared to 
captive substations, which provide a dedicated supply to the owner, the distribution lines 
coming out of a utility-owned substation spread across a vast difficult-to-monitor 
geographical area. Therefore, firms located further downstream tend to experience more 
interruptions. More precisely, firms with captive substations report 0.8 fewer outages per 
day on average than other firms (see column 2).  
Unplanned outages also last for a shorter period for high- and medium-voltage firms 
than for low-voltage firms (see column 3). This finding is consistent with the study by 
LaCommare and Eto (2006), who find that larger commercial and industrial customers 
often experience shorter power interruptions than smaller commercial and residential 
customers. The results indicate that both medium- and high-voltage firms report durations 
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of unplanned outages that are 0.99 and 1.49 hours shorter than those reported by low 
voltage-firms. 
It can be inferred from the empirical results that in the case of a utility-owned 
substation, service reliability diminishes for all because electricity users fail to internalize 
the overloading costs that they impose on others. When distribution substations are 
privately owned, the costs of overloads are borne directly by a profit-maximizing business 
owner with the proper incentives to protect the substation against overloads. The 
operational performance of low-voltage networks can be improved by adding new 
substations to reduce the number of consumers covered by each substation. The investment 
appraisal of captive substations as a method of mitigating losses from unplanned outages 
described in Section 2.3.4 is carried out in this section. 
The CBA is conducted for a representative firm with an average of 1 MWh electricity 
consumption per hour. Given its power consumption, this firm requires a substation with a 
capacity of 2 megavolt amperes (MVA). The investment cost of constructing a 2 MVA 
substation in Nepal is estimated to be around 0.75 USD million, with annual operating and 
maintenance costs of 0.016 USD million, at 2016 prices28. 
                                                          
28 The technical requirements and cost estimates listed in this section are provided with consultation 
of business owners in Nepal who have invested in captive substations. The initial investment cost 
includes the cost of acquiring land, construction of a building to house switchgears and panels, cost 
of equipment, transmission line from the substation to the site’s power station, and delivery costs. 
Also, to maintain the quality of service from the substation, there are annual operation and 
maintenance costs (O&M). The O&M cost is mainly the labor cost and the materials required for 




The CBA starts with the saving in tariff rates as the only benefit considered. Using a 
tariff difference of 2.76 US cents per kWh (the average value of rate difference presented 
in Table 2.1), the investment has a negative NPV unless the firm operates for 16 hours 
every day, plans for load growth in the near future, or shares the substation with another 
firm. This highlights the critical role of a substation’s utilization rate in the investment’s 
net value. The utilization rate needs to be sufficiently high to make the investment 
financially feasible, but not so high as to cause overloading. 
Following the discussion in Section 2.3, apart from the savings in electricity expenses 
a captive substation also provides substantial benefits by reducing losses during power 
outages. The next step in the analysis is to calculate the opportunity cost of the electricity 
not supplied due to power outages, using the levelized cost of the electricity lost. The 
levelized cost can be estimated by taking the present value of the losses in contribution 
value that would have borne by the firm over the captive substation’s life and dividing this 
value by the present value of the quantity of the electricity supply that would have been 
lost during this period. The levelized cost is the rate per kWh that would make the NPV of 
the electricity not supplied equal to the costs inflicted by the power outages. Assuming a 
levelized cost of 0.50 US cents per kWh and 16 hours of daily operation, the NPV of 
substation investment by a representative firm amounts to 0.97 USD million at 2016 
prices29.  
                                                          
29 To calculate the benefits from the value of lost production saved, one of the main inputs is the 
additional power supplied by the captive substation (ℎ𝑖,𝑡 in Eq. 5). Here, it is assumed that the 
captive substation mitigates one hour of unplanned outage per day, a cumulative duration of 365 
hours per year. Hence, having a captive substation translates into 365 MWh of additional power 
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A significant risk factor associated with captive substation investments is uncertainty 
about the future status of the electricity reliability provided by the electric utility. The more 
reliable the electric utility’s service provision becomes, the lower the inflow of benefits 
from savings in losses due to outages will be. Breakeven analysis is conducted to estimate 
what fraction of the current frequency of outages (365 hours per year) would make the 
NPV equal to zero. It appears that even if only 42 percent of power outages (153 hours per 
year) take place, the investment would still be financially viable. 
Because the sample is nationally representative, the economic gains to the whole 
economy can also be estimated. About 10 percent of the firms in the sample have captive 
substations, of these firms, 88 percent are industrial or manufacturing. As reported in the 
National Economic Census (NEC), the total population of manufacturing establishments 
in Nepal is 104,058. Therefore, a total of 93,652 firms can potentially get connected to 
newly-built private substations with reforms facilitating private ownership of substations. 
Assuming that each private substation would probably be relevant for clusters of five firms 
(to create enough demand to justify a substation), the maximum number of private-sector 
substations would be 18,730. With 0.97 USD million net economic gains from a 
representative substation, the total economic gains to Nepal would amount to 18.17 USD 
billion at 2016 prices. 
                                                          
supplied. This assumption is reasonable given that the low-voltage firms with shard substations 
report an average of 1 unplanned outage per day and a median duration of 2 hours for an extended 
unplanned outage. Moreover, Hashemi et al. (2018) evaluate the cost of outages using hourly data 
for three manufacturing firms in Nepal. The three-year average of cumulative duration of 
unplanned outages experienced by the firms per year range from 282 to 409 hours. 
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The CBA presented above assumes that investors can undertake to build substations, 
buy high-voltage electricity from the public electric utility, and then sell reliable low-
voltage electricity to customers. However, building a captive substation in Nepal is a 
challenging proposition in the current institutional and governance framework. First, it 
requires special permissions from the public electric utility, which are subject to 
bureaucratic procedures. The next challenge is to acquire the land needed for housing the 
substation.  Since a substation must be located close to high-voltage transmission towers, 
the choice of location is limited. Although regulations allow the land adjacent to roads to 
be used for this purpose, a transmission line from the substation to the point of consumption 
must pass through the land belonging to third parties, creating contractual challenges.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the quantitative significance of common-pool resource 
problems in electric network infrastructures. The transmission of electricity by local 
distribution networks requires load and capacity management that increases in complexity 
with the number of users. Moreover, a local electric network is limited in physical capacity, 
and its overuse leads to reduced reliability of electricity service. Using firm- and 
substation-level data from a sample of Nepalese firms, the results provide an empirical 
evidence of CPR problems across ownership boundaries and network configurations. The 
findings show that those with captive substations are less likely to report frequent 
unplanned outages than those with shared substations. Moreover, unplanned outages 
reported by captive-substation firms last for shorter periods. These findings are consistent 
with the results of Pless and Fell (2017) that consumer-level behavior on the demand side 
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of the electricity market creates negative impacts on the overall quality of the service due 
to common-pool resource characteristics of electricity. 
The findings of this chapter indicate that the CPR problem could be largely solved if 
private firms were allowed to own and operate substations. Currently, private ownership 
of substations is prohibited in Nepal unless they are unique to a single firm that owns and 
uses all the electricity from a substation. The cost-benefit analysis presented in this paper 
demonstrates that the annual gain to a representative firm from eliminating this restriction 
would be on the order of 0.32 USD million. 
One concern about privatizing a part of the distribution segment would be the 
possibility of local monopoly pricing by parties owning the substations. This requires a 
contracting system to mitigate local monopoly pricing of electricity. Moreover, the need to 
consider the hold-up risk is critical during the transition period to competition (Valletti & 
Estache, 2001). Allowing both public and private substations to exist side-by-side can be a 








Table 2.1: Retail electricity tariffs in Nepal (2016 prices) 
Tariff 
category 
Electricity charge by voltage (US cents per 
kWh) 
Rate difference (US cents per kWh) 
Reference for high voltage: 7.14 US cents per 
kWh 
Low Medium 
Between low  
& high  
Between medium  
& high  
Industrial 9.14 8.19 2.00 1.05 
Commercial 10.67 10.57 3.53 3.43 





































Value of output (USD 
mil.) 
      
Value of output  334 24 152 288 27 10.85 
Direct costs of 
production (USD mil.)  
      
Raw material 276.05 16.45 107.84 215.59 8.85 5.94 
Electricity 3.60 0.25 3.95 4.98 0.95 0.09 
Other (fuel, water, repair 
and maintenance, etc.) 
3.35 0.65 4.22 8.81 5.25 0.92 
Total direct costs 283.00 17.35 116.01 229.38 14.19 6.95 
       
Total contribution value 
(USD mil.) 
51 6.65 35.99 58.62 12.81 3.90 
MWh of electricity 
purchased 
74,418 5,293 46,914 105,811 12,863 1,326 
Contribution value 
(USD per kWh) 
0.69 1.26 0.77 0.55 1.00 2.94 















Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Voltage of Connection 
Low 
n = 435 
Medium  
n = 105 
High 
n = 50 
Current monthly utility electricity bill (USD) 1,565 4,296 7,267 
 (5,437) (5,173) (9,660) 
Electricity reliability measures    
Whether experienced unplanned outages on a daily 
basis (No = 0 , Yes =1) 
0.36 0.36 0.04 
Number of unplanned outages in a day 1.07 0.93 0.09 
 (1.69) (1.38) (0.43) 
    
Duration of most extended unplanned outage 
experienced (hours) 
3.44 2.31 1.24 
 (3.10) (1.54) (0.72) 
    
Firm characteristics    
Number of full-time employees 50.89 129.00 125.28 
 (128.00) (302.15) (223.18) 
Firm size    
Small 0.53 0.32 0.16 
Medium 0.37 0.36 0.42 
Large 0.10 0.32 0.42 
Sector of activity    
Industry/manufacturing 0.49 0.80 0.88 
Services 0.51 0.20 0.12 











Table 2.4: Substation configuration and electricity reliability 
Variable 
OLS OLS OLS 




(No = 0 , Yes =1) 
Dep. Var.: 
Frequency of 
unplanned outages in 
a day 
Dep. Var.: Duration 
of most extended 
unplanned outage 
experienced (hours) 
Voltage of connection    
Medium  - 0.02 - 0.06 - 0.99*** 
 (0.06) (0.19) (0.38) 
    
High - 0.30**** - 0.78*** - 1.49*** 
 (0.08) (0.27) (0.52) 
    
Regional distribution 
center FE 
YES YES YES 
    
No. of observations 451 451 409 






































Note: The figure depicts a schematic of the electric network in Nepal. Distances in the layout are 
not to scale, and they have been shrunk or exaggerated to elaborate the concept. At the distribution 
level, three voltages are offered to consumers: high, medium, and low. Each step of voltage 
reduction adds to the cost of supply. Therefore, the energy charge per kWh of electricity delivered 






























STDS: Sub-transmission Distribution Substation 
PDS: Primary Distribution Substation 
SDS: Secondary Distribution Substation 
EHV: Extra-high voltage 
HV: High voltage 
MV: Medium voltage 
LV: Low voltage 
  
EHV / HV HV / MV MV / LV 
Distribution network 
7.14 ¢/kWh  9.38 ¢/kWh  10.73 ¢/kWh  




Figure 2.2: Percentage loss in distribution networks across Nepal by regional distribution 
centers 
 

















THE EFFECT OF IMPROVEMENTS IN GRID-ELECTRICITY ACCESS ON 




As low-income countries strive to meet United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goal 7 (SDG 7, universal access to electricity), residential electricity consumption remains 
low despite substantial investments in grid expansion programs (Blimpo & Cosgrove-
Davies, 2019; Blimpo et al., 2020)30. Supply-side constraints have been blamed for low 
electricity consumption (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015; Aidoo & Briggs, 2019; Pelz & 
Urpelainen, 2020), since insufficient upstream capacity in the generation and transmission 
segments and overloaded downstream infrastructure in the distribution segment cause 
varying availability and reliability levels for consumers connected to the same national 
grid31. 
                                                          
30 “Universal access to modern energy by 2030” is one of the three key pillars of the Sustainable 
Energy for All (SE4All) program, an initiative co-chaired by the United Nations (UN) Secretary 
General and the World Bank President. 
  
31 Availability of grid-electricity takes into account the timing and duration of supply and reliability 
considers the frequency of interruptions to supply. Although availability and reliability may be seen 




This study investigates the impact of improvements in grid-electricity access on the 
electricity consumption of households at different income levels32. Using a nationally 
representative sample of Nepalese residential consumers consisting of 4,660 households, I 
investigate the extent to which improved reliability of the electricity grid is likely to affect 
electricity consumption of both the poor and the non-poor. 
I segment households into similar groups based on the supply constraints they face 
using an unsupervised machine learning technique. To categorize the different levels of 
reliability available to households, I group households along three dimensions: available 
hours of electricity per day (maximum of 24 hours), available hours of electricity during 
the evening peak-time (6-10 PM, a maximum of 4 hours), and frequency of outages 
experienced by households in a typical week. I estimate the optimal number of clusters via 
the K-means clustering technique33. The largest cluster comprises 55% of the sample, with 
the rest of the households are distributed across four clusters, representing 5%, 11%, 10%, 
and 19% of the sample. The clusters reveal three distinct patterns of grid-electricity 
constraints: (1) low availability with frequent outages (clusters 1 and 2); (2) high 
availability with frequent outages (clusters 3 and 4); and (3) high availability without 
frequent outages (cluster 5).  
                                                          
32 Improved access to the grid-electricity supply can be defined in terms of enhanced attributes of 
electricity that make it more usable for the desired applications. In this paper, I focus on the impact 
of enhancing the availability and reliability attributes on electricity consumption. 
 
33 The objective of the K-means clustering technique is to achieve the highest intra-cluster similarity 
and lowest inter-cluster similarity. Observations are grouped into k homogenous clusters. The first 
step of the analysis is to determine the optimal number of clusters. Following the previous literature, 
I use the elbow method (Ramachandran et al., 2018), which determines the number of clusters by 
examining the within-cluster variance as a function of the number of clusters. 
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After identifying household clusters, I investigate the extent to which unreliable 
access constrains households’ electricity demand at different income levels by focusing on 
the impact of system reliability on electric appliance ownership. The residential demand 
for electricity is derived from the household’s demand for electric appliance services. 
Unreliable electricity affects a household’s choice of appliances because it reduces the 
benefit for the household from ownership of such appliances. Therefore, if reliability 
improvements impact households’ purchase decisions and the portfolio of appliances 
owned, they will also impact electricity consumption (McRae, 2010; Meeks et al., 2020). 
This approach avoids the potential endogeneity bias due to unobserved factors determining 
both the appliance choice and electricity consumption when electric appliance ownership 
is an independent variable in electricity demand estimation (McRae, 2010). 
I find that improved access to grid electricity is positively correlated with the 
probability of electric appliance ownership. The interaction of income and supply-
constraint indicators in a piecewise regression model suggests that the insufficient capacity 
of power supply constrains households equally at all income levels. In contrast, the 
frequency of unplanned service interruptions does not appear to matter at any income level. 
These findings imply that if electricity from the grid were available 24-hour a day, the 
average duration of the remaining outages would probably be so short that it would not 
affect electric appliance ownership decisions.  
In addition, I find that the effect of income on appliance ownership is approximately 
the same across all income quintiles. The importance of this finding is highlighted when I 
investigate how households’ coping behavior changes when they experience different 
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levels of reliability. The results from an ordered probit model with three backup decision 
alternatives indicate no association between backup decisions and income in the first two 
income quintiles. On the other hand, higher-income quintiles are associated with significant 
changes in coping behavior when electricity is available from the grid all day long, and 
unplanned outages are not frequent. Thus, the increased availability of supply hours from 
the grid matters more for poor households, for whom the combined cost of both appliances 
and backup equipment may be prohibitive34. 
With more progress being made toward achieving SDG7, the findings in this study 
highlight how unreliable access to electricity constrains the acquisition of household 
electric appliances. Thus, reliability improvements are expected to increase benefits from 
electric appliance usage through greater household appliance ownership and, consequently, 
increased electricity consumption.  
Recent studies have highlighted the importance of employing a multi-dimensional 
measurement framework rather than simply counting grid connections when measuring 
energy access and the associated economic impacts (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015; Mendoza et 
al., 2019; Pelz & Urpelainen 2020). A focus on counting connections - politically 
motivated in most cases - without considering household electrical energy service 
utilization has deteriorated electric utilities’ cash flows in low-income countries (Blimpo 
& Cosgrove-Davies, 2019). The findings presented in this paper show that a multi-
                                                          
34 Poorer households either do not invest in coping equipment or use low-quality coping equipment 
(such as kerosene and candles) that provide low-quality lighting services. 
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dimensional measure framework is extremely useful in studying the impact of 
improvements in grid-electricity constraints on electricity consumption. 
3.2 Methodology and data 
3.2.1 Methodology  
The availability and reliability of grid-electricity supply is a multi-dimensional 
issue that should be measured using a variety of indicators representing multiple attributes. 
For instance, outages may be frequent but last for only a few minutes or for several hours. 
In addition, the time of day when grid electricity is available is an essential factor because 
the demand for lighting services - the main category of electricity consumption in low-
income countries - is highest during the evening hours. Therefore, if grid power is available 
for extended hours during the day but constrained during the evening, households will still 
be significantly constrained in their electricity use. 
Various supply-side and demand-side factors can cause power outages. Supply-side 
causes include insufficient upstream capacity in the generation and transmission segments 
and overloaded downstream infrastructure in the distribution segment. Outages can also 
occur when the peak demand for electricity exceeds the total amount that the system can 
supply. Thus, the availability and reliability of electricity supply from the same national 
grid may vary from one locality to another. 
In this paper, differences in system reliability are explored using K-means 
clustering, an unsupervised data-mining technique with applications in various fields such 
as market segmentation analysis and social network studies. In the energy economics 
literature, K-means clustering has been used to analyze smart-meter data to understand 
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residential electricity load profiles and consumption patterns (Trotta, 2020). Estimates of 
these patterns have been used in load forecasting, tariff design, and demand-response 
programs (Rhodes et al., 2014; Trotta, 2020). Identifying consumer segments with similar 
electricity load profiles allows for a broader range of policy analyses in electricity markets, 
including studies of the advisability of grid expansion and the efficient level of service 
reliability (Hayn et al., 2014).  
After identifying the relevant household clusters in terms of service reliability, I 
exploit the variation in reliability across household clusters to estimate the effect of 
improvements on high-load electric appliance ownership. The residential demand for 
electricity is derived from the households’ demand for electric appliances. Unreliable 
electricity affects a household’s choice of appliances because it reduces the benefit for the 
household from ownership of such appliances. Therefore, if reliability improvements 
impact households’ purchase decisions and the portfolio of appliances owned, they will 
also shift the demand curve for residential electricity. The alternative of estimating the 
electricity demand, using either electricity bills or hours of consumption as the dependent 
variables, is likely to yield inconsistent estimates because of the clear endogeneity of 
appliance ownership as a regressor. 
3.2.2 Data Description 
I use a nationally representative survey of Nepalese households, collected as part 
of the World Bank’s Multi-Tier Framework (MTF) for Assessing Energy Access Program 
(World Bank, 2019). The survey was conducted in 2017, one year after the total elimination 
of load shedding in Nepal through electric power imports from India. The sample design 
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was based on a two-stage stratification to ensure the national representativeness of the 
sample. In the first stage, the enumeration areas were selected randomly within 
stratifications, representing urban and rural areas and Nepal’s three distinct ecological 
regions (mountains, hills, and terai). In the second stage, households were randomly 
selected for interviews from wards chosen in the first stage. The raw dataset consists of 
6,000 households, of which 4,660 were grid-connected. I focus only on those grid-
connected households in this study. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the 3,847 
grid-connected households for which there are no missing data.  
The household segmentation variables listed in Table 3.1 represent three 
dimensions of system reliability. Households report in the survey that electricity from the 
grid is available on average for almost 22 hours per day, with a minimum of 7 and 
maximum of 24 hours of availability. Moreover, the frequency of outages per week varies 
greatly across households, with a mean of 7 and a standard deviation of 9.37. The third 
dimension of reliability is peak-time availability, measured as the hours of grid electricity 
availability from 6 PM to 10 PM. The sample average is 3.56 hours with a standard 
deviation of 0.68 hours. The three panels in Figure 3.1 illustrate the district-level average 
hours of grid electricity availability, frequency of outages, and peak-time availability.  
Households reported a wide variety of electric appliance ownership, ranging from 
light bulbs and mobile phone chargers, which require only a few watts, to space heaters 
and air conditioners, which require several kilowatts. Based on the amount of electricity 
needed to operate, their electric appliances can be categorized as low-power or high-power 
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(see Table 3.2)35. The more high-load appliances a household owns, the higher is its 
demand for grid electricity for a given level of income. In addition, wealthier households 
tend to have more high-load appliances because of their higher incomes. The distribution 
of the total number of high-load appliance ownership represents skewness in consumption, 
with a mean and median of 1.46 and 1, respectively.  
In electricity markets with frequent power outages, household coping behavior is a 
strong predictor of current and future electricity demand (Hashemi, 2021)36. The 
households in the sample reported ownership of a wide range of coping equipment for 
lighting purposes during blackouts, including disposable batteries (used with flashlights), 
kerosene lamps, solar lanterns, and solar lighting. Some households also use high-quality 
coping equipment such as rechargeable batteries, voltage stabilizers, and generators to 
power their appliances during service outages. The survey asked two questions about each 
household’s coping behavior: whether it uses any backups for (1) lighting only and (2) 
lighting plus appliances. Based on the responses to these two questions, I define three 
binary variables for a household’s backup status: no backup, backup for lighting only, and 
backup for both lighting and appliances. While 9 percent of households do not engage in 
                                                          
35 According to the World Bank’s MTF framework, appliances with load levels less than 200 watts 
are low-power appliances, and those with load levels greater than 200 watts are high-power 
appliances. 
 
36 Coping behavior refers to decisions made by electricity consumers about how to deal with power 
outages. During blackouts, consumers may use their off-grid coping equipment (such as 




any coping behavior, 60 percent of them back up for lighting only and 31 percent back up 
for both lighting and appliances.  
The survey also collected information about households’ characteristics. I use those 
characteristics documented in the literature as predictors of electricity demand (Lee et al., 
2016; Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; Tesfamichael et al., 2020): income, time spent at 
home, educational attainment, and urban/rural locality. I use the recurring combined 
monthly expenses reported by households on food, rent, and other services as a proxy for 
income37. I divide households into quintiles of total monthly expenditures. Thirty three 
percent of the households in the sample live in rural areas, with the other 67 percent spread 
across urban areas. Thirteen percent of household heads in the sample report as retired and 
12 percent report as housewives/househusbands. This is relevant because if the household 
head is a housewife/husband or retiree, electricity demand is likely to be affected because 
that person spends more time at home. 
3.3 Results 
I use the elbow method developed by Makles (2012) to find the optimal number of 
clusters. Figure 3.2 illustrates the within-cluster variance plotted against the number of 
clusters. The criterion for choosing the optimal number of clusters is to find a point where 
the marginal decline in within-cluster variance falls to the “elbow” point. For these data, 
                                                          
37 Other goods and services include medical and pharmacy expenses; cleaning supplies, cosmetics, 
toiletries, water expenses; mobile phone top-up; internet, land phone, cable, and other household 
communication; and transportation costs. 
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the number of clusters beyond which marginal reductions in within-cluster variance are not 
significant is five. 
Table 3.3 lists the unscaled mean and standard deviation of segmentation variables 
across the five clusters and the number of observations in each cluster. Cluster 5 is the 
largest group comprising 55% of the sample. The rest of the sample households are 
distributed across clusters 1 to 4, representing 5%, 11%, 10%, and 19% of the sample. As 
shown in Figure 3.3, overall and peak-time availability hours are significantly less than the 
sample average for the first group (clusters 1 and 2). While the frequency of outages is 
above the sample average for the second group (clusters 3 and 4), grid electricity is 
available for longer hours for the households in this group. Cluster 5 exhibits the lowest 
variability in the duration of grid-electricity availability (standard deviation of 0.77 hours). 
Households in this cluster also report an uninterrupted service during the evening peak 
hours. Based on the segmentation variables, the clusters reveal three distinct system 
reliability levels: (1) low availability with frequent outages (clusters 1 and 2); (2) high 
availability with frequent outages (clusters 3 and 4); and (3) high availability without 
frequent outages (cluster 5). 
Table 3.4 reports the estimated coefficients for a linear probability model with an 
indicator for high-load appliance ownership as the dependent variable without applying the 
K-means clustering method. These estimates imply, counterintuitively, a negative relation 
between peak-time availability and appliance ownership. Additionally, the frequency of 
outages is estimated to have only a very small effect on the likelihood of high-load 
appliance ownership. It seems likely that the K-means clustering method offers a better 
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way to characterize grid reliability, essentially because of the way it deals with 
multicollinearity among system reliability measures. The K-means clustering method 
achieves that by grouping households into unique clusters of supply constraints instead of 
using each measure of supply constraint as a separate regressor. 
Table 3.5 shows the results of a linear piecewise regression model with indicators 
for reliability clusters and defined breakpoints at income quintiles to allow the marginal 
effect of income to vary by quintile. I find that extended hours of availability matter equally 
for all income levels, whereas the frequency of unplanned service interruptions does not 
matter at any income level. As shown in column 1, although improvements in each supply 
constraint are associated with a higher probability of high-load electric appliance 
ownership, the magnitude of these impacts is the same in all income quintiles. In particular, 
when availability hours are extended, those with and without frequent outages are equally 
more likely (17 percent) to own high-load appliances. Thus, it appears that once availability 
is increased, the frequency of unplanned outages does not affect households’ appliance 
ownership decisions.  
Moreover, there are no differences in the marginal effects of income across clusters 
when they are interacted with cluster indicators (column 2). With the most severe 
constraints as the reference group (low availability with frequent outages), the results 
indicate that none of the income groups is more constrained than others by service 
availability. I also estimate separately the impact of each availability measure (daily and 
peak-time) on appliance ownership. As shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, I find no statistically 
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significant difference in the impact of reliability on appliance ownership across income 
levels.  
In all specifications the marginal effect of income on appliance ownership is 
statistically significant at the first income quintile, holding constant the reliability level. 
The importance of this finding is highlighted more when I investigate how a household's 
coping behavior changes with access improvements. The estunates for an ordered probit 
model with the three alternative backup decisions as the ranked categories (Table 3.8) 
suggest that when the availability and reliability of service are relatively improved, 
consumers change their coping behavior. In particular, with a reasonably reliable service, 
when power outages occur households reschedule their use of electric appliances and use 
backup for lighting only. However, for poorer households, the marginal effect of income 
is not significant. In other words, income constraints limit both appliance ownership and 
coping decisions.  Thus, it is expected that the impact of increased availability of supply 
hours from the grid may be more substantial for poorer households. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This paper estimates the extent to which electricity consumers of different income 
levels would increase their use of high-load appliances in response to improvements in grid 
reliability. The results indicate that although grid-connected households are counted in the 
electrification statistics, unreliable electricity service significantly constrains their electric 
appliance ownership and, consequently, electricity consumption. Putting this paper’s 
findings into SDG 7’s perspective, a connection to the grid by itself does not necessarily 
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translate to realized benefits from electricity consumption. The availability and reliability 



















Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Segmentation variables     
Daily availability of grid electricity 21.93 2.89 7 24 
Frequency of outages 6.97 9.37 0 88 
Availability during the evening peak time (6 – 10 PM) 3.56 0.68 0 4 
     
Household characteristics     
Electricity bill in a typical month (USD) 4.94 7.43 0.04 77.31 
Total number of high-load appliances 1.43 1.94 0 10 
Quintiles of total monthly expenditures     
1st  73.44 19.66 14.28 100.66 
2nd  122.09 12.46 100.76 144.19 
3rd  166.90 13.81 144.28 192.57 
4th  228.20 23.27 192.66 274.00 
5th  492.05 415.52 274.17 3,666.48 
Backup status     
No backup 0.09    
Only for lighting 0.61    
Both for lighting and appliances 0.30    
Education status of the household head     
No formal education 0.35    
Primary  0.22    
Secondary 0.38    
College education 0.05    
Household head gender     
Female 0.20    
Time spent at home     
Retired / too old to work 0.12    
Housewife/husband 0.11    
Locality     
Urban 0.66    
     
Number of observations  3,847    









Table 3.2: Appliances owned by households in the sample 
Appliance type by the power load 
Low-load High-load 
Incandescent Light Bulb Refrigerator 
Fluorescent Tube Hairdryer 
Compact Fluorescent Light (CFL) Bulb Electric food processor/blende 
LED Light Bulb Electric rice cooker 
Radio/CD Players/sound system Microwave oven 
VCD/DVD Electric Iron 
Fan Washing machine 
Computer/ Laptop Electric sewing machine 
Smartphone (internet phone) charger Air cooler 
Regular mobile phone charger Air conditioner 
Black & White TV Space Heater 
Regular Color TV Electric water heater 
Flat color TV Electric hot water pot/kettle 
 Electric Water Pump 














Table 3.3: Variation in segmentation variables across clusters 
Segmentation variable 
Cluster 
1 2 3 4 5 
Daily availability hours (max. 
of 24 hours) 
13.70 18.48 21.40 21.63 23.55 
 (3.26) (2.36) (1.98) (1.25) (0.77) 
      
Frequency of outages 37.09 9.73 12.81 8.44 2.14 
 (10.83) (6.11) (7.49) (5.90) (2.20) 
      
Availability during the peak 
time (max. of 4 hours) 
2.86 2.26 3.99 2.99 4.00 
 (0.81) (0.57) (0.05) (0.09) (0.00) 
      
Number of observations 193 417 392 716 2,129 
Percentage of the sample 5% 11% 10% 19% 55% 


















Table 3.4: Estimates of system reliability impacts without K-means clustering 
Variable 
OLS 
Dep. var.: high-load electric 
appliance ownership 
  
Grid-electricity supply constraints  
  
Daily availability hours 0.0264*** 
 (0.0035) 
  
Frequency of outages - 0.0034*** 
 (0.0010) 
  





Number of observations 3,847 
Notes: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls 
include indicators household’s income, housewife/husband, too old to work or retired, female, educational 
















Table 3.5: System reliability and appliance ownership 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for 
housewife/husband, too old to work or retired, female, educational attainment, and rural-urban status. 
 
Variables 
Dep. Var.: High-load electric 
appliance ownership 
(1) (2) 
Clusters of grid-electricity supply constraint   
High availability with frequent outages 0.1678*** 0.1963 
 (0.0222) (0.1447) 
   
High availability without frequent outages 0.1728*** 0.1936 
 (0.0205) (0.1682) 
Total monthly expenditures (USD)   
Quintile 1 expenditures 0.0031*** 0.0040*** 
 (0.0006) (0.001) 
   
Quintile 2 expenditures - 0.0010 - 0.0025 
 (0.0012) (0.003) 
   
Quintile 3 expenditures 0.0003 0.0018 
 (0.0013) (0.003) 
   
Quintile 4 expenditures - 0.0013 - 0.0047** 
 (0.0009) (0.0023) 
   
Quintile 5 expenditures - 0.0001*** 0.0013 
 (0.0003) (0.0009) 
Interaction between high availability with frequent outages and expenditures   
   
Quintile 1 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages  - 0.0004 
  (0.0018) 
   
Quintile 2 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages  0.0004 
  (0.0038) 
   
Quintile 3 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages  - 0.0027 
  (0.0041) 
   
Quintile 4 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages  0.0056* 
  (0.0029) 
   
Quintile 5 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages  - 0.0030** 
  (0.0012) 
Interaction between high availability without frequent outages and expenditures   
   
Quintile 1 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages  - 0.0011 
  (0.0016) 
   
Quintile 2 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages  0.0020 
  (0.0035) 
   
Quintile 3 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages  - 0.0071 
  (0.0037) 
   
Quintile 4 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages  0.0028 
  (0.0026) 
   
Quintile 5 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages  - 0.0030*** 
  (0.0010) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 3,847 3,847 
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Table 3.6: Daily availability and appliance ownership 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for 
housewife/husband, too old to work or retired, female, educational attainment, and rural-urban status. 
 
Variables 
Dep. Var.: High-load electric appliance 
ownership 
(1) (2) 
Grid-electricity supply constraint (ref. group: < 24-hour 
availability) 
  
24-hour availability  0.0594*** - 0.0157 
 (0.0148) (0.1143) 
Total monthly expenditures (USD)   
Quintile 1 expenditures 0.0032*** 0.0029*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) 
   
Quintile 2 expenditures - 0.0013 - 0.0006 
 0.0012 (0.0015) 
   
Quintile 3 expenditures 0.0006 - 0.0001 
 (0.0013) (0.0017) 
   
Quintile 4 expenditures - 0.0012 - 0.0016 
 (0.0009) (0.0012) 
   
Quintile 5 expenditures - 0.0012*** - 0.0006 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Interaction between availability and expenditures   
Quintile 1 expenditures × 24-hour availability  0.0006 
  (0.00127) 
   
Quintile 2 expenditures × 24-hour availability  - 0.0018 
  (0.0025) 
   
Quintile 3 expenditures × 24-hour availability   0.0020 
  (0.0027) 
   
Quintile 4 expenditures × 24-hour availability  0.0005 
  (0.0018) 
   
Quintile 5 expenditures × 24-hour availability  - 0.0015** 
  (0.0007) 
   
Controls YES YES 




Table 3.7: Peak-time availability and appliance ownership 
Variables 
Dep. Var.: High-load electric 
appliance ownership 
(1) (2) 
Grid-electricity supply constraint (ref. group: < 4 hours of availability 
between 6-10 PM) 
  
Peak-time availability (4 hours of availability between 6-10 
PM) 
0.0309** 0.0220 
 (0.016) (0.1041) 
Total monthly expenditures (USD)   
Quintile 1 expenditures 0.0031*** 0.0033 
 (0.0006) (0.0010) 
   
Quintile 2 expenditures - 0.0013 - 0.0012 
 (0.0012) (0.0021) 
   
Quintile 3 expenditures 0.0005 - 0.0013 
 (0.0013) (0.0022) 
   
Quintile 4 expenditures - 0.0013 0.0005 
 (0.0009) (0.0016) 
   
Quintile 5 expenditures - 0.0012*** - 0.0014 
 (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Interaction between availability and expenditures   
   
Quintile 1 expenditures × Peak-time availability  - 0.0002 
  (0.0013) 
   
Quintile 2 expenditures × Peak-time availability  - 0.0003 
  (0.0026) 
   
Quintile 3 expenditures × Peak-time availability  0.0034 
  (0.0027) 
   
Quintile 4 expenditures × Peak-time availability  - 0.0031 
  (0.0020) 
   
Quintile 5 expenditures × Peak-time availability  0.0003 
  (0.0008) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 3,847 3,847 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for 





Table 3.8: Supply constraints and coping behavior 
Variables 
Backup status 
No backup Lighting only Lighting and 
appliances 
    
Clusters of grid-electricity supply constraint    
High availability with frequent outages - 0.0156* - 0.0184* 0.0341* 
 (0.0081) (0.0096) (0.0176) 
    
High availability without frequent outages 0.0332*** 0.0393*** - 0.0726*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0170) 
    
Total monthly expenditures (USD)    
Quintile 1 expenditures - 0.0002 - 0.0003 0.0005 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
    
Quintile 2 expenditures - 0.0007 - 0.0009 0.0016 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0010) 
    
Quintile 3 expenditures 0.0013** 0.0016** - 0.0029** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
    
Quintile 4 expenditures - 0.0008* - 0.0009** 0.0017** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
    
Quintile 5 expenditures 0.0004*** 0.0005*** - 0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
    
Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 3,847 3,847 3,847 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for 








Panel A. Daily availability of grid electricity 
 
Panel B. Frequency of outages 
 
 
Panel C. Availability of grid-electricity during the evening peak time (6-10 PM) 
























Figure 3.3: Standardized mean values of segmentation variables by cluster 
 











I Appendix of Chapter 1: Sample Representativeness 
How representative are the samples used in this study? For the household sample, 
there are two other samples available with a few comparable attributes. The first one is the 
sample collected by the World Bank’s Multi-Tier Framework for Measuring Energy 
Access 2017. The second source is from Nepal’s National Census of 2011 (the latest 
available at the time of this study). Along with most of the demographic and socioeconomic 
attributes, sample statistics appear to be reasonably representative of the population at large 
(see Table A1).  
For the firm sample, the only available sample at the time of this study is the World 
Bank’s Enterprise Survey 2013. As shown in Table A2, this study’s sample statistics are 












Table A1: How representative is the household sample? 
Variables 








Sample size 1,800 4,042 2,067,609 
    
Population distribution    
By urban/rural status    
Urban 0.56 0.82 0.73 
Rural 0.44 0.18 0.17 
    
By ecological region    
Mountain 0.02 0.10 0.05 
Hill 0.58 0.50 0.47 
Terai 0.40 0.40 0.48 
    
By development Region    
Eastern 0.20 0.27 0.21 
Central 0.43 0.44 0.41 
Western 0.19 0.15 0.23 
Mid-western 0.10 0.07 0.08 
Far-western 0.08 0.07 0.06 
    
Household characteristics    
No formal education 0.20 0.34 - 
Household size 5.14 - 4.88 
    
Coping technologies*    
Inverters 0.19 0.29 - 
Solar panel 0.16 0.19 - 
Solar lantern 0.01 0.03 - 
Voltage stabilizer 0.11 0.15 - 
Candle 0.20 0.08 - 
Kerosene 0.13 0.14 - 
    
Notes 












Table A2: How representative is the firm sample? 
Variables 
The sample used in this study 
(2016) 
World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(2013) 
Sample size 590 482 
   
Firm location   
Urban 0.81 0.79 
Rural 0.19 0.21 
   
Region of establishment   
East 0.21 0.11 
Central 0.43 0.70 
West 0.36 0.19 
   
Coping technology*   
Diesel generator 0.68 0.54 
   
Firm size**   
Small 0.46 0.60 
Medium 0.38 0.27 
Large 0.16 0.13 
   
Notes 
* The World Bank survey only asks about diesel generators’ ownership, whereas the sample used in this 
study asks about a list of different coping technologies. 
** The World Bank survey measures a firm’s size by the number of its employees, but the sample used in 
this study measure a firm’s size by its annual turnover, the same approach used by Nepal’s Internal Revenue 
Department. Given that there is a high correlation between a firm’s number of employees and its annual 










II Appendix of Chapter 1: Cheap Talk Script 
Table B1. Cheap Talk script used for the contingent valuation  
We would like to know how much you value better quality electricity service. No one will change your 
electricity tariff as a result of what you say.  However, if you value electricity enough, the government 
may decide to invest more in electricity and your tariff may have to increase to pay for the investment. 
Some people over-estimate the amount they are willing to pay because they are frustrated by the current 
situation and want the investment to happen. If many respondents provide higher estimates, then the 
government could set a higher tariff for electricity which is beyond your ability to pay. 
Likewise, some people underestimate the amount that they are willing to pay because they are concerned 
that they already pay too much, or they lie thinking that the government will charge them less. But, if 
enough people respond this way, the government will think that electricity is not important to you and 
may not make additional investments in electricity improvement projects. 
Please also be aware of your expenses on alternative energy sources, such as candles and kerosene, and 
how your family’s budget will be affected if you no longer have to purchase so many alternatives to 
electricity. 
Your VDC or Municipality will be at a disadvantage whether you over-estimate or under-estimate your 
willingness to pay. So, please try to be honest and tell us only what you are truly able and willing to pay 
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